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FEE AT LAST? WORK RELEASE
PARTICIPATION FEES AND THE TAKINGS
CLAUSE
Sara Feldschreiber*
Five days a week he works as a paralegal at a large law firm in New
York, commuting back and forth from his apartment across the
bridge. Two nights a week he returns to his once-permanent home-a
correctional facility in New York. He is a work release participant,
commuting back and forth between his status as a prisoner and a
mainstream employee. The Department of Corrections trusts his
rehabilitation enough to release him five days a week.
The
Department also trusts his earning potential, collecting twenty percent
of his net salary to cover the costs of his room and board at the prison.
The inconsistency should be obvious; twenty percent of the salary of a
New York paralegal exceeds the cost of two nights at a New York
prison facility.
INTRODUCTION

With the costs of incarceration rising steadily, almost every state has
some form of reimbursement plan which defers the costs of prison
away from taxpayers and onto prisoners.' These reimbursement plans
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor James Cohen for his guidance, Dean William Treanor for his helpful
comments and Michael Quartararo for his efforts and inspiration.
1. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nat'l Inst. of Corr., Fees Paid by Jail Inmates: Findings
from the Nation's Largest Jails, Special Issues in Corrections 3 (February 1997),
available at http://www.nicic.org/pubs/1997/013499.pdf [hereinafter Fees Paid]. The
majority of the data on prison reimbursement plans comes from a survey done by the
National Institute of Corrections ("NIC") Jails Division and Information Center. Id.
at 1. The survey was sent to those jails with populations of over 1,000 inmates
participating in the "Large Jail Network" ("LJN"). Id. In states without members of
the LJN,the NIC sent surveys to the largest jails in those states. Id. The data is based
on information provided by all states except Alaska, Louisiana and West Virginia. Id.
Among the prisons surveyed, seventy-seven of them collect fees from inmates. Id.
Forty-one states have passed legislation authorizing the collection of fees. Id. at 2.
Although this Note will focus on state reimbursement fees, it is important to
note that reimbursement programs exist at the federal level as well. The Bureau of
Prisons is authorized to release a prisoner to "work at paid employment in the
community" if
"the prisoner agrees to pay to the Bureau such costs incident to official
detention as the Bureau finds appropriate and reasonable under all the
circumstances, such costs to be collected by the Bureau and deposited in the
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cover a wide range of expenses and operate on many different levels.2
Typically the fees are divided into four different categories: per diem

fees, medical service fees, non-program fees and program fees.3
Although reimbursement fees generally have the backing of the
courts,4 not all members of the public consider the fees reasonable.'6
This Note examines the constitutionality of work release program
participation fees, specifically those that are generated by charging
participants a percentage of their salary.

As of February 1997, nine states charged work release participants
an uncapped percentage of their salary to cover the costs of the

program.7 New York, the focus of this Note, charges prisoners a fee
of twenty percent of their net salary to cover expenses that reasonably
relate to their participation in the program.8 Although this system
Treasury to the credit of the appropriation available for such costs at the
time such collections are made."
18 U.S.C. § 3622(c)(2) (2002).
2. See generally Fees Paid,supra note 1, at 2. Prisons charge inmates fees ranging
from telephone use to room and board. Id. In Connecticut, inmates are responsible
for "the costs of certain services and programs such as sick calls; dental procedures;
eyeglasses; elective and vocational educational programs; extended family visits; and
lab tests to detect illegal drugs, if the results are positive." George Coppolo, Requiring
Inmates to Pay for Their Incarceration, OLR Research Report, Nov. 8, 2002 (citing
at
available
18-85(a)1-4),
§
Regs.
Agencies
Conn.
http://cga.state.ct.us/2002/olrdata/ud/rpt/2002-RO906.htm. The method of collection
also varies depending on the type of fee: telephone charges are billed to the caller,
while fees for room and board are deducted from a prison account. See infra notes 1226 and accompanying text.
3. Fees Paid, supra note 1, at 2. Per diem fees cover the general cost of prison
administration, including housing and food costs, and most prisons require that
inmates pay a co-pay to cover costs of medical services. Id. at 2. Non-program fees
cover costs for the use of prison services, such as telephones and barbers, while
program fees are collected to defray the cost of prison programs such as work release,
parole, and education services. Id.
4. See discussion infra Part II.A 1, 2.
5. See, e.g., Sam Walker, Inmates Pay Debt to Society and Taxpayers- With Cash,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Feb. 26, 1996, at 1 (noting that "advocates complain that
forcing ex-inmates to pay incarceration fees amounts to double jeopardy," but others
think the fees promote responsibility among inmates); Angela Couloumbis, Quietly,
Camden County Collects $500,000 from Inmates, Phila. Inquirer, July 29, 1998, at B1
(noting that a New Jersey prison has "quietly" collected over $500,000 from prisoners,
despite criticism of the program).
6. Work release is a program that permits eligible prisoners to secure
employment outside of the prison and leave the facility to work, most frequently, on a
daily basis. N.Y. Correct. Law § 150 (McKinney 2003). For a more detailed
description of work release, see discussion infra Part I.C.
7. Fees Paid,supra note 1, at 13-14 tbl.10,. These states include New Hampshire,
Rhode Island and Indiana. Id.
8. Pursuant to New York regulations:
Once an inmate becomes employed, he will be required to pay a work
release participation charge of 20 percent of net earnings. However, no such
charge shall be collected until all prior advances have been repaid by the
inmate. The work release participation charge will help to defray
administrative, room and board costs.
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 1903.2(f)(3)(i)(b) (2003). The regulation draws
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seems fair, when twenty percent of an inmate's salary exceeds what is
necessary to cover the "appropriate and reasonable costs related to
the inmate's participation in the program,"9 the percent of wages
ceases to be a reasonable reflection of the costs of the program." This
Note argues that correctional directors violate the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment when they offer no benefit in return for these
excessively garnished wages. 1 While work release participation fees
authorized by statute have yet to be challenged on the basis of the
Takings Clause, this Note argues that an uncapped fee based on salary
would fail to withstand that challenge.
Part I of this Note discusses the typical reimbursement fees
implemented across the country. Part II discusses the most frequent
social and legal challenges to reimbursement fees and why they have
failed. Part III suggests a novel challenge to New York's work release
participation fee, based on the Takings Clause. Finally, Part III

proposes a statutory amendment

to the current problematic

upon sections 112, 852 and 860 of New York's Correction Law for its general
authority for the promulgation of this regulation. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit.
7, § 1903 (2003). Section 112 grants the commissioner of the Department of
Corrections ("DOCS") general authority over "all matters relating to the
government, discipline, policing, contracts and fiscal concerns" of correctional
facilities and inmates. Section 852 provides for the establishment and management of
the temporary release programs. Section 860 authorizes the "disposition of earnings"
as follows:
The earnings of an inmate participating in a work release program, less any
payroll deductions required or authorized by law, shall be turned over to the
warden who shall deposit such receipts as inmates' funds pursuant to section
one hundred sixteen of this chapter. Such receipts shall not be subject to
attachment or garnishment in the hands of the warden. The commissioner of
correction may authorize the warden to make disbursements of such
receipts, and such receipts may be disbursed, for any or all of the following
purposes:
1. Appropriate and reasonable costs related to the inmate's participation in
the work release program;
2. Support of the inmate's dependents;
3. Payment of fines imposed by any court;
4. Payment of any court ordered restitution or reparation to the victim of the
inmate's crime.
5. Purchases by the inmate from the commissary of the institution.
The balance of such receipts, if any, after disbursements for the foregoing
purposes shall be paid to the inmate upon termination of his imprisonment.
N.Y. Correct. Law § 860 (McKinney 2001).
9. Id. The work release program costs $7,500 per work release participant, per
year. Dep't of Corr. Servs., Temporary Release Program, 2001 Annual Report 10
(2001) [hereinafter DOCS 2001 Report]. Any work release participant who earns a
net salary above $37,500 would be paying more than $7,500 in reimbursement fees.
See infra note 287 and accompanying text; discussion Part III.A.
10. Prisoners who earn more than $37,500 per year in net salary pay more than the
actual cost of their room and board, but there is no stipulation that they should get
extra benefits for the excess fees they pay.
11. The Takings Clause prohibits the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. See U.S. Const. amend. V. A much more in-depth
discussion of the Takings Clause follows. See infra discussion Part I.D.
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provisions in place, suggesting that capping the twenty percent fee
would be a simple solution to the constitutional challenge.
I. PAYING FOR THE CRIME AND THE TIME: THE RISE OF
REIMBURSEMENT FEES

A. Reimbursement Fees in General

Some states charge prisoners for use of non-program prison

services, calling the fees collected "user fees." 12

Typically these

services include haircuts, drug testing, and, most frequently, telephone
use. 13 User fees generate substantial revenue for the respective
prisons and thus help defray costs away from the taxpayers) 4 In 1997,

San Bernardino County Jail in California generated $2,330,176 simply
by charging prisoners for their telephone calls. 5 Starting in the early
1990s, many prisons instituted a second type of fee, charging a copayment for medical services. 6 The widespread adoption of co-

payments was motivated by more than just a desire to lower taxes; the

fee was implemented in an attempt to deter frivolous medical visits. 7
12. Fees Paid,supra note 1, at 9. In most states, the authority to charge prisoners
user fees is determined locally. Id.
13. Id. at 9-12. At least ten states charge fees for telephone use, generating an
average total of over $500,000 in revenues per year. Id. at 11. Prince George's County
Jail in Maryland is one of nine prisons in nine states to charge a fee for haircuts. Id.
The six dollar fee generates $23,600 annually. Id.
14. Id. at 12. According to the report a portion of the fees collected are directed
to the county general fund. Id. The prison telephone system is also highly lucrative
for the telephone companies. In California, MCI installed payphones in all of the
prisons at no charge to the state. Justin Carver, An Efficiency Analysis of Contracts
for the Provision of Telephone Services to Prisons, 54 Fed. Comm. L.J. 391, 392
(2002). In exchange, MCI gives the California Department of Corrections thirty-two
percent of the revenue, which can reach up to $15,000 annually-per payphone. Id.
These prison payphones generate up to five times more revenue than regular
payphones, as MCI imposes a three dollar surcharge on every call. Id. This type of
arrangement "is by no means unique [to California]; it is the rule, rather than the
exception." Id. at 392-93.
Generally states use the revenue from the phones to benefit the prisoners
directly, either by funding programs organized by DOCS, or health care for prisoners.
Id. at 400. These phone contracts can be problematic if the revenue is not used
appropriately. In Florida, one prison was cited for having "failed to establish
'controls to safeguard, reliably account for, or efficiently use the telephone
commission monies and was using inmate funds for staffing positions not directly
related to the Trust Fund."' Id. at 400 (citation omitted). For an overview on
problematic prison telephone contracts, see id. at 391-404.
Ironically, the surcharges for telephone use are almost always imposed on the
person being called rather than the inmate. Fees Paid, supra note 1, at 12. Rather
than defer the costs of incarceration away from the taxpayer, this system redirects the
costs of incarceration to the taxpaying families of the prisoners.
15. Id. at 11.
16. Id. at 4. According to the survey, all but 15 states require inmates to pay for
medical services in some form. Id.
17. See id. at 4.
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Although not in force in as many states as the medical fee, a third
source of revenue is the "per diem" ee. 18 Sixteen states have laws
authorizing jails to charge each prisoner a per diem fee reflecting the
"county's actual costs of room and board and other basic services."19
In some states the fee is the actual cost of services. 0 In other states
the fee is capped at a maximum, such as in Michigan, where the fee is
sixty dollars a day.2
In addition to per diem fees, user fees, and medical services, many
prisons also impose fees on inmates who participate in programs
implemented by the prison, including "weekender" incarceration,
electronic monitoring, rehabilitation programs, education or
substance abuse treatment, and work release.2 2 This Note focuses on
the work release program, which permits inmates to work outside of
the prison.3 Work release participation fees may be calculated as a
percentage of the salary earned, a sliding scale proportional to the
participant's salary or, most frequently, a flat fee per week. 4 In 1996,
work release programs across the country generated average revenues
of $230,500 per prison. In 2001, work release participants in New
York earned $7,066,489 and paid $2,125,858 in taxes.26
B. Authority
Generally, prisons glean authority for reimbursement fees from
state statutes.2 ' As of 1997, at least forty-one states have enacted
statutes authorizing some form of reimbursement fees. 28 The statutes
run the gamut from very general to highly specific; some directly
dictate how the costs will be calculated while others give broad
authority to the sheriff or a committee to decide how the fee will be
implemented and collected.
Kentucky's statute authorizes the
sentencing court to determine the "amount of incarceration costs" to
be paid by the person who is sentenced, based on "(a) [t]he actual per
18. Id. at 6-9.
19. Id. at 6. California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas,
Wisconsin and Wyoming all charge inmates per diem fees. Id. at 3.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 13-16.
23. For a detailed description of work release programs, see discussion infra Part
I.C.
24. Fees Paid,supra note 1, at 13.
25. Id. at 15.
26. DOCS 2001 Report, supra note 9, at 10.
27. Fees Paid,supra note 1, at 2. The amount of fees charged for medical care and
per diem fees are usually determined by state legislative action, while local policy
makers typically impose user fees, either by the sheriff or approval by the county
supervising board or commission. Id. at 9. Authority for program participation fees
comes from both local decisions and state legislation. Id. at 13.
28. Id. at 2.
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diem, per person cost of incarceration; (b) [t]he cost of medical
services provided to a prisoner less any copayment paid by the
prisoner; and (c) [t]he prisoner's ability to pay all or part of his
incarceration costs. ' 29 Ohio is more specific as to the "per diem" cost.
There, the "costs of confinement may include, but are not limited
to... a per diem fee for room and board."3 The prisoner is given an
itemized bill at the end of his confinement and works out a payment
schedule upon his release.3
Without the authority from a statute, prison reimbursement fees
could be deemed unconstitutional.3 2 In Turner v. Nevada Board of
State Prison Commissioners, the U.S. District Court for the District of

Nevada held that the statute authorizing the program director to
"deduct from the wages of any offender such amounts as the director

deems reasonable to meet any existing obligation of the offender for
the support of his family or restitution to any victim of his crime" did
not give the director the authority to take an additional fee for room

and board.33 The court further held that after subtracting the costs of

obligatory family support and victim restitution, the remainder of the
wages belonged to the prisoners.3 4 Because the prisoners had a
"property interest"35 in the remainder of their wages, the director was

not authorized to make any additional deductions to cover costs not
authorized by statute, including room and board.36 Despite the fact
that the director had misappropriated the funds for room and board,
the court could not grant injunctive relief for the inmates.37 The
Nevada legislature subsequently amended the statute authorizing the
prison to deduct the cost of maintenance.38
29. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.352 (Michie 2001).
30. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.37 (Anderson 2001).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Turner v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 624 F. Supp. 318, 321
(D. Nev. 1985) ("[B]ecause we find that no statutory authority for maintenance
deductions prior to the new amendment existed and that Nevada statutes established
the plaintiffs' right to compensation for work performed, defendants could not deny
that right to plaintiffs without affording them due process of law.").
Without a statute permitting the collection, public criticism rises. In 1996
Camden County, New Jersey, began to collect five dollars a day from prisoners
housed in the county jail, ultimately raising $500,000. After noting that "New Jersey
is not one of those states" authorized to collect fees, the report then moves on to state
that "[t]he movement has elicited criticism from the American Civil Liberties Union."
See Couloumbis, supra note 5.
33. Turner, 624 F. Supp at 320-21.
34. Id.
35. Finding that a prisoner has a property interest in his wages is the first step in
proving that the statute or fee is a violation of due process or the Takings Clause. For
a more in-depth discussion of property interests, due process and the Takings Clause,
see discussion infra Parts I.D, II.A.3.
36. Turner,624 F. Supp. at 320-21.
37. Id. at 322.
38. Id. at 321. The revision to the statute came in April 1985, just a few months
before the trial. Id.
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Although a statute is a necessary requisite, it does not guarantee
protection from the court. In one instance, the Ninth Circuit held that
the failure to pay inmates interest on prison accounts could be a
violation of the Takings Clause, despite the existence of a statute
authorizing the appropriation of the interest.3 9 In Schneider v.
California Department of Corrections, the court pointed out that "as
the Supreme Court's decisions... demonstrate, constitutionally
protected property rights can-and often do-exist despite
statutes... that appear to deny their existence."40 Ultimately, on
remand, the court held that the statute was not a violation of the
Takings Clause.41 Although not absolutely necessary, the source of
authority, namely the statute, is still crucial to the analysis of the
constitutionality of reimbursement programs.
C. Work Release ParticipationFee
1. Work Release Background
In an attempt to relieve prison overcrowding and to curtail the
rising costs of incarceration, over forty states authorize prison work
release programs.42 The early work release programs, which were
initiated in the 1920s and rapidly expanded in the 1970s, authorized
prisoners nearing the end of their sentences to work in the community
during the day and return to the prison or to residential facilities
during non-working hours.43 Work release has proven to be costeffective. A study done in Washington state, where there was a jump
of seventy-one percent in incarceration from 1980 to 1996, showed
that incarcerating a prisoner with a four to six month work release
costs nearly $4,000 less than incarcerating a prisoner without work
release."
Work release has also been successful in helping
participants adapt to the community.4 5
39. Schneider v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 1998). See
infra notes 246-66 and accompanying text.
40. Schnieder, 151 F.3d at 1199 (citations omitted).
41. The Fourth Circuit was faced with a similar issue in Washlefske v. Winston, 234
F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000), and refused to apply Schneider's property interest ruling. Id.
at 186. Instead, the court held that in Virginia, prisoners had no property interest in
their wages and thus had no right to the interest on their accounts. See id. at 185-86,
see also infra notes 267-78 and accompanying text.
42. Susan Turner & Joan Petersilia, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Work Release:
Recidivism and Corrections Costs in Washington State 1 (1996).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 6-7. In Washington, the total cost for incarceration of each prisoner
without work release is $30,790. The total cost with work release is $26,404. Id.
45. See id. at 1 ("Nearly a quarter of all prisoners released in Washington made a
successful transition to the community through work release."); see also Jeff Potts,
American Penal Institutionsand Two Alternative Proposalsfor Punishment, 34 S.Tex.
L. Rev. 443, 510 (1993) (outlining the problems with incarceration and touting the
benefits of alterative programs such as work release).
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2. Work Release in New York
The work release program in New York was initiated in 1970 "in
order to assist [inmates] towards a more gradual transition from
incarceration to parole."4 6 Work release is a branch of the temporary
release program, which includes programs such as furlough,4 7
educational release,48 and community services leave.4 9 The program is
authorized by section 852 of the New York Corrections Law, with
New York Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations ("NYCRR")

title 7, sections 1900-52 detailing the specifics of the temporary release
program. The work release program allows inmates to leave a facility

for up to fourteen hours a day to work in the community." Of the
5,895 inmates in the temporary release program, 5,670 of them
participate in work release." Inmates may be eligible for work release
if they are within two years of their parole and receive a qualifying
score on their application to a committee overseeing the program.5 2
Applications are scored based on eleven items, with six based on
criminal history and five based on behavior while in departmental

custody. 53 Eleven facilities in New York offer one or more continuous
temporary release programs, and many are solely dedicated to
housing work release participants.54 Although the correctional facility

will help an inmate find a job, work release participants are expected
to pay for the costs of their own employment. 5 A parole officer is
required to visit the participant's place of employment to monitor the
46. DOCS 2001 Report, supra note 9, at 12; see also Ortiz v. Wilson, 448 N.Y.S.2d
918, 919 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (finding that the purpose of a temporary release program is
to reduce recidivism by helping inmates to return to a normal and productive life).
47. Furlough "[a]llows inmates to leave a facility for up to seven days to maintain
and strengthen family ties, or for other appropriate purposes." DOCS 2001 Report,
supra note 9, at 6.
48. Educational release "[a]llows inmates to leave a facility to pursue academic
goals for up to 14 hours in a day." Id.
49. Community services leave "[aIllows inmates to leave a facility to do volunteer
work or to attend religious or athletic events." Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 7.
52. See N.Y. Correct. Law § 851(2) (McKinney 2003); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. &
Regs. tit. 7, § 1900.4 (2003).
53. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 1900.4(e). The six criminal behavior
factors are prior or subsequent incarceration; prior or subsequent felony convictions,
prior misdemeanor convictions, outstanding warrants at the time of or subsequent
date of commitment; previous arrest and conviction or revocation while on parole or
probation in the last ten years. The remaining five factors are based on institutional
behavior. An inmate can earn a maximum of sixteen points if he or she participates in
a program or work assignments during the two years immediately prior to his
application. An inmate can also accumulate up to four points for having a "good
disciplinary record" over a certain period of time. If the inmate was on temporary
release before, he can also lose points for a bad temporary release record.
Id. § 1900.4(e)(2).
54. DOCS 2001 Report, supra note 9, at 7-9.
55. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 1903.2 (f)(7)(ii)(a),(b).
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participant's behavior and attendance. Some prisoners can qualify for
a "5 and 2 status," which allows them to live at home for five days and
stay at the prison for two days, or roughly twenty hours.56 In 1995,
Governor Pataki instituted a program that "precluded those who
commit violent acts from participating in temporary release
programs."57
The temporary release program aims "to reduce recidivism by
helping inmates to return to a normal and productive life. ' 58 The New
York program has proven successful; the most recent study found that
only eight percent of work release participants returned to jail
compared to a twenty-seven percent rate of return among those
inmates who did not participate in work release. 59 The program is also
cost-effective; in 2001 the work release program cost a total of $7,500
to operate compared to the cost per inmate per year in a "traditional"
prison, $29,700.60 In 2001, this savings amounted to over $44,932,800.61
3. Work Release Participation Fees in Other States
Not only is work release cheaper to administer than full-time
incarceration, but work release also generates revenue through work
release participation fees.62 The fees differ among state programs;
some impose per diem fees, some a percentage of salary, and others a
flat fee.63 State statutes authorizing the work release program often
authorize directors and administrators to collect fees under broad
guidelines. Other statutes are far more specific about what can and
cannot be collected. The Massachusetts law governing the work
release program is highly specific, authorizing the sheriff to deduct for
lodging, clothing, travel and food.' In contrast to this specific laundry
list of services, California Penal Code section 4024.3(f) is far more
vague, stipulating that "[t]he board of supervisors may prescribe a
program administrative fee, not to exceed the pro rata cost of
56. See, e.g., Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 81-82 (2d Cir. 2000)
("[Pllaintiff was granted work release pursuant to New York State Correction Law,
which allows inmates to 'leav[e] the premises of an institution ...for the purpose of
on-the-job training or employment.' Over time, Friedl was allowed to spend most
nights at home, residing in prison only two nights each week." (citations omitted)).
57. DOCS 2001 Report, supra note 9, at 1.
58. Ortiz v. Wilson, 448 N.Y.S.2d 918, 919 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (citations omitted).
59. DOCS 2001 Report, supra note 9, at 11.
60. Id. at 10.
61. Id.
62. Annual revenues average $230,500 per prison. Fees Paid,supra note 1, at 15.
63. Id. at 13. According to the survey, "[n]early twice as many jails charge a flat
fee as collect a percentage of work release income." Id.
64. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 127, § 86F (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 2003). The statute
stipulates: "[A]n amount determined by the sheriff for substantial reimbursement to
the county for providing food, lodging and clothing for such inmate; [... ] the actual
and necessary food, travel and other expenses of such inmate when released for
employment under the program .....Id.
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administration, to be paid by each person according to his or her
ability to pay."' 65 Similarly, in Baltimore County, Maryland, the
Administrator of the Baltimore County detention facilities may
charge a reasonable fee not to exceed the costs of participating in the
program. 6666 This type of provision resembles California's in that the
inmates cannot be charged more than the true value of the costs they
incur. Baltimore County also resembles California in that the
Administrator is free to choose the method of charging participantsbe it a per diem fee, a capped percentage of earnings, or a flat fee-as
long as the fee charged does not exceed the costs.
Not all state statutes explicitly stipulate a fee cap. In Virginia, wages
can be distributed to "defray the cost of [a work release participant's]
keep," and for expenses related to work release employment.67 The
statute does not require that the amount exacted be at or below the
actual cost. 68 The prison facility in Arlington County, Virginia charges
inmates a fee of twenty-five percent of their gross wages. 69 Fairfax
County, Virginia also charges a twenty-five percent fee, but that fee is
capped at forty-two dollars a day.7" In Norfolk, Virginia, work release
participants are only charged six dollars a day, regardless of their
gross wages.7' Florida, like New York, imposes an uncapped fee
based on a percentage of the prisoner's wages.
The Florida
Department of Corrections requires the inmate to pay the state fortyfive percent of their net wages towards room and board.7
In Kentucky, the fee is also based on a percentage of the prisoner's
wages and not the exact cost of the room and board, but that total fee
is capped.73 Every prisoner who is "gainfully employed" is liable for
"the cost of his board in the jail, for an amount up to twenty-five
percent (25%) of the prisoner's gross daily wages, not to exceed forty
dollars ($40) per day, but not less than twelve dollars ($12) per day."74
According to the survey done by the National Institute of Corrections
("NIC"), Jefferson County prison, in Kentucky, charges its work
65. Cal. Penal Code § 4024.3(f) (West 2000).
66. "The Administrator may charge a participant a reasonable fee in an amount
not to exceed the actual costs incurred by the county for food, travel, and other
expenses related to the participant's participation in the work release program." Md.
Code Ann., Correct. § 11-7050) (1999 & Supp. 2002).
67. Va. Code Ann. §§ 53.1-131(A)(1),(2) (Michie 2002). "Distribution of such
wages shall be made for the following purposes: 1. To pay an amount to defray the
cost of his keep; 2. To pay travel and other such expenses made necessary by his work
release employment...." Id.
68. Id.
69. Fees Paid,supra note 1, at 14 tbl.10.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Florida Department of Corrections, Frequently Asked Questions Regarding
Work Release, at http://www.dc.state.fl.us/othi/inmates/wr.html (last visited July 27,
2003).
73. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 439.179(4) (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2002).
74. Id.
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release participants twenty-five percent of their gross wages without a
maximum or minimum cap.75
4. Work Release Participation Fees In New York
Following the practice of other states, New York prisons receive a

benefit from the work release participants in the form of "[r]egular
allowances." 76

NYCRR title 7, section 1903.2(f)(3) provides for a

method of collecting the "reasonable costs" as established in section
860 of the New York Corrections Law.77 The regulation requires that
"[o]nce an inmate becomes employed, he will be required to pay a

work release participation charge of 20 percent net earnings" for the
purposes of helping to "defray administrative, room and board
costs. ' 78 Inmates are also expected to "assume all expenses related to
their participation in [the] program," and "all costs related to their
travel to and from work."7 9 According to the New York Department

of Corrections ("DOCS"), in 2001, work release participants earned a
total of $7,066,489, which means that twenty percent, or $1,413,298 in

program fees, could have been collected by DOCS.0 In addition,
participants paid $2,125,857 in federal, state and local taxes.81
The current twenty percent fee was instituted in 1999.82 Prior to
1999, the participants paid a fee based on a sliding scale, a system
where the fee was contingent upon salary but capped at a maximum
charge.83 Depending on the net pay, the weekly payment to the
institution was a fixed rate ranging from $10 for those making $99 a

week or less, to $45 for those making over $200.8I

Since 1997,

75. Fees Paid, supra note 1, at 14 tbl.10.
76. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 1903.2(f)(3) (2003). New York
Corrections Law section 860 stipulates that
[t]he earnings of an inmate participating in a work release program, less any
payroll deductions required or authorized by law, shall be turned over to the
warden who shall deposit such receipts as inmates' funds pursuant to section
one hundred sixteen of this chapter. Such receipts shall not be subject to
attachment or garnishment in the hands of the warden. The commissioner of
correction may authorize the warden to make disbursements of such
receipts, and such receipts may be disbursed, for any or all of the following
purposes: 1. Appropriate and reasonable costs related to the inmate's
participation in the work release program.
N.Y. Correct. Law § 860 (McKinney 2001).
77. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 1903.2(f).
78. Id. § 1903.2(f)(3)(i)(b).
79. Id. § 1903.2(f)(3)(i)(a),(ii)(a).
80. DOCS 2001 Report, supra note 9, at 10.
81. Id.
82. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 1903.2(f)(iii)(b) (1996).
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Assemblyman McLaughlin has tried to change the fee by proposing
an amendment to sections 860 and 872 in the New York State
Assembly Committee on Corrections.85 With this year no different
than the last six, McLaughlin proposed the bill again in January of
2003, calling for the addition of a provision stipulating a deduction of
"monies from the salaries of inmates working in work release
programs for reasonable costs not to exceed 10% of earnings in excess
of $100 and expenses" related to inmates' participation in work
release programs.86 According to the Sponsor's Memorandum, the
new bill "acknowledges the importance of an inmate's incentive
towards saving and is sensitive to the fact that many inmates earn low
wages."8 7 This objective is consistent with the overall rehabilitative
goal of the work release program: If inmates can learn to save money,
they will be ready for life outside of prison.
Further, the proposed amendment would do more than lower and
cap the fee. As proposed, the bill would make it easier for prisons to
collect information on the actual costs incurred, facilitating
administration overall.88 The bill seems to suggest that currently the
administrators
are collecting fees
without "comprehensive
information" regarding the actual costs of the work release program.8 9
Indeed, the current versions of sections 860 and 872 only offer a
vague, moderate standard for calculating the fee: "[aippropriate and
Net Pay
Under $99
$100-$149
$150-199
Over $200

Weekly
Payment
$10
$25
$35
$45

See id.
85. A. 2528, 2003 State Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003-2004). The six other bills
died in the committee on corrections. Id. Section 872 provides for the disposition of
inmate earnings:
(2) a sum determined by the sheriff to be the cost to the county of providing
food, lodging and clothing for such prisoner subject, however, to approval by
the state commission of correction;
(3) a sum determined by the sheriff to be the cost to the county of the actual
and necessary food, travel and other expenses of such prisoner when
released from confinement for the purpose of participating in the work
release program.
N.Y. Correct. Law § 872 (McKinney 2001).
86. A. 2528, 2003 State Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003-2004).
87. Id.
88. According to the proposal:
[T]here is a lack of comprehensive information in inmate earnings, program
costs and actual disbursements to cover these costs. This bill guarantees the
collection of these funds, provides for the establishment of rules to
determine how much an inmate can be charged to be housed and fed in a
work release facility, and initiate the maintenance of records to aid in
effective program administration.
Id.
89. Id.
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reasonable costs related to the inmate's participation"90 simply "to be
determined by the sheriff."91 According to the proposal, this system
does not ensure accurate and efficient disbursement. There are no
guidelines mapping out how these costs should be calculated, nor are
there any requirements that the warden keep a log of the daily costs.
Under the current standard, wardens of New York prisons are hardly
held accountable for the accuracy of the fee collected; as long as the
fees are appropriate they will be within the guidelines of the statute.
Without anyone to guide the calculation of costs or to monitor the
disbursement of fees, the twenty percent payments fall subject to
abuse and misappropriation. There seems to be no way to ensure that
the participants are paying fees that accurately reflect the cost of
room, board and administration fees. The prison is effectively taking
the prisoners' salary without conferring a benefit back to them.
Under these circumstances, the work release participation fee lies
vulnerable to a challenge based on the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
D. Takings
The Takings Clause provides: "[N]or shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."92
The Fifth
Amendment's prohibition applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.93 Typically, property owners invoke the
Takings Clause to protect them from the government's physical
occupation of real property.94 In the past hundred years, the Supreme
Court has held that regulatory takings occur when governmental
regulations deny land owners the full economic benefit of their
property.9 5 The Supreme Court has also found that economic
regulations involving the appropriation of money can effectuate a
violation of the Takings Clause.96 Although these scenarios do not
present what the Supreme Court has called the "classic taking," when
"the government directly appropriates private property for its own

90. N.Y. Correct. Law § 860 (1)(McKinney 2001).
91. Id. § 872 (2), (3).
92. U.S. Const. amend. V.
93. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383 (1994) ("The Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution [is] made applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment ....
").
94. See generally William M. Treanor, The Original Understandingof the Takings
Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782 (1995); see also Note, The
Principle of Equality in Takings Clause Jurisprudence,109 Harv. L. Rev. 1030 (1996)
(noting that prior to the twentieth century, the Takings Clause was applied to physical
takings of actual property).
95. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), was the watershed regulatory
takings case. The Court held that economic regulations that went "too far" in
interfering with property rights would be a taking. Id.
96. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S 498 (1998).
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use.., economic regulation... may nonetheless effect a taking."9 7

On a number of occasions the Supreme Court has found that
''money ... constitutes 'property' for purposes of applying the
Takings Clause."98

There is no "set formula"9 9 for determining when a seizure or
regulation has gone too far, and thus the body of law surrounding the
The current
Takings Clause has been described as a "mess."'"
standard for determining when a regulation curtailing the value of
property is a taking is a three-factor test drawn from the Supreme
Court's decision in Penn Central Transportation Company v. New

York City." 1 The test measures the economic impact, investment-

backed expectations, and fairness of the legislation on a case-by-case
basis." 2 This ad hoc review has led to muddled case law and a wide

body of exacting scholarship.
Further adding to the mix is the case law surrounding the economic
regulations involving the appropriation of money, which is the focus
of this Note. 103 In earlier cases, represented below by Webb's
Fabulous Pharmaciesv. Beckwith,1 " the Supreme Court did not seem
to have an operating standard to determine a takings violation; rather,
the court simply looked to see if the regulation was reasonable on an
ad hoc basis.0 5 Almost twenty years later, in Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel the Supreme Court applied the three-factor test to determine if
an appropriation of money violated the Takings Clause."° Although
over the years the Court recognized that challenges to appropriation
of money should be evaluated by a different test than physical
appropriations of real property,10 7 it was not until Eastern that the
97. Id. at 522-23 (holding that the Coal Act requiring Eastern Enterprises to fund
retired miner's health care was a violation of Takings Clause).
98. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper
Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 713,
725 (2002); see also, e.g., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998); United
States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n.9 (1989); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc.
v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
99. E. Enters., 524 U.S at 523 (noting that the "process for evaluating a
regulation's constitutionality.., by its nature, does not lend itself to any set
formula").
100. Treanor, supra note 94, at 782; see also Krotoszynski, supra note 98, at 713
("Recent regulatory takings cases, however, utilize a hodgepodge of factors to
determine the essential nature of the government's action.").
101. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
102. Id. at 124.
103. As Ronald Krotoszynski sums up, "the ad hoc nature of the Supreme Court's
current regulatory takings doctrine is profoundly embarrassing." Krotoszynski, supra
note 98, at 738.
104. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
105. Id.
106. 524 U.S. 498, 523-24 (1998).
107. See United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n.9 (1989) (charging that
deduction of two percent of an award from the Iran-United State Claims Tribunal was
a violation of the Takings Clause, but because "money is fungible" it is not subject to
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court had actually implemented the three-factor test to strike down an
economic regulation appropriating money.'0 8 The Court came closer
to articulating a rule, but at the same time sparked a heated debate
questioning the authority to evaluate economic regulations through
the Takings Clause. 109
In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,"° one early Takings Clause
challenge to an economic regulation, the Supreme Court reached a
verdict with little equivocation.
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,
operating in Florida, was involved in litigation and placed
$1,812,145.77 in the county interpleader fund;". this amount
generated $100,000 in interest.!1 2 According to section 28.33 of the
Laws of Florida, chapter 73-282, section 1, interest accruing on the
fund was deemed "income of the office of the clerk of the circuit
court.""' 3 In addition to the interest, the clerk was also paid a fee of
$9,228.74 for "services rendered," in accordance with Florida
Annotated Statutes, section 28.24(14)'14 The pharmacy challenged
the statute authorizing the county court to take the interest on the
grounds that the appropriation violated the Takings Clause." 5
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun focused the analysis on
whether the interpleader fund was public or private property.' 16 After
determining that "[i]t was property held only for the ultimate benefit
of Webb's creditors, not for the benefit of the court and not for the
benefit of the county," Blackmun then moved on to the status of the
interest." 7 Reasoning that interest follows principal, the Court
refused to accept the argument that the interest was public property,
and instead held that the interest belonged to Webb's until the prior
litigation was over." 8 Further, the county already exacted a standard
fee covering the costs of services, rendering the collection of interest
"not reasonably related to the costs of using the courts.""' 9 As such,
the Court held that the statute "appropriat[ed] for the county the
value of the use of the fund" and therefore was "a taking violative of
the same analysis as real or personal property); See, e.g., Phillips v. Wash. Legal
Found., 524 U.S. 156, 176 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting).
108. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
109. Some scholars have argued that the plurality ruling is Lochner-esque in its
interference with economic legislation. See generally Krotoszynski, supra note 98;
Note, supra note 94.
110. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
111. Id. at 156-57.
112. Id. at 158.
113. Id. at 160 (quoting Fla. Stat. Ann. § 28.24(14) (West 1977)).
114. Id. The statute prescribed that the county clerk is to be paid "for services
rendered" for "receiving money into the registry of the court," calculated as follows:
one percent of the first $500, and then one-half percent of the remainder. Id.
115. Id. at 155-56.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 161-62.
118. Id. at 162-63.
119. Id. at 163.
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the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 1 2° The takings analysis in
this opinion is short and relatively uncomplicated, and unanimous in
the method of inquiry.
When the Supreme Court was faced with another economic
regulation takings claim in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, almost twenty
years later, the resulting analysis was complicated and controversial. 2'
In Eastern, a company formerly in the coal industry successfully
challenged the Coal Act, a regulation requiring coal companies to
retroactively pay retired miners' healthcare, on the grounds that its
retroactive funding plan violated the Takings Clause. 22 Under the
Act, Eastern was required to pay $50 to $100 million in healthcare
benefits for 1,000 retired miners. 123 The Court was divided 4-1-4, with
the plurality holding that the regulation did in fact violate the Takings
Clause. 124 In the plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor used a threefactor test to determine whether the Act crossed the takings line. The
economic impact, the "extent to which the regulation interferes
with.., investment-backed expectations," and the character of the
governmental action were all factored in to determine whether the
125
economic regulation was a violation of the Takings Clause.
Ultimately, Justice O'Connor found that the Act was a "severe,
disproportionate, and [an] extremely retroactive burden on Eastern,"
126
sufficient to fall under the protection of the Takings Clause.
Central to the ruling was the notion that the legislation "single[d] out
certain employers to bear a burden that is substantial in
amount... implicat[ing] fundamental principles of fairness underlying
The Court struck down the Act as
the Takings Clause."'2 7
unconstitutional.
The remaining Justices believed that the case did not fit the proper
profile for relief under the Takings Clause; instead, they thought the
case should be analyzed under the Due Process Clause. 128 Justice
Kennedy concurred that the Act was unconstitutional, but he
dissented in part with the plurality's reliance on the Takings Clause,
reasoning that the retroactive Act of great severity was traditionally

120. Id. at 164-65.
121. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). Unlike the unanimous decision in
Webb's, the justices were divided over Eastern. See Krotoszynski, supra note 98, at
723-24.
122. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 499.
123. Id. at 499-500.
124. Id. at 503-04.
125. Id. at 518-19.
126. Id. at 538.
127. Id. at 537.
128. The plurality did not find it necessary to analyze the due process claim.
"Because we have determined that the third tier of the Coal Act's allocation scheme
violates the Takings Clause as applied to Eastern, we need not address Eastern's due
process claim." Id. at 538-39.
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protected by the Due Process Clause. 129
The remaining four
dissenters, led by Justice Breyer, felt "there is no need to torture the
Takings Clause to fit this case," but that even under the proper due
process analysis, the Act was sound. 130
The plurality opinion has been criticized for further blurring the
lines between substantive due process and the Takings Clause. It
employed language traditionally used in due process inquiries"arbitrary and irrational"-and proposed a due process remedy rather
than just compensation, yet it labeled the violation a taking.' 3 ' In
addition, some scholars have argued that through Eastern, the Takings
Clause has been used to accomplish the foregone goals of Lochner v.
New York. 3 2 By separating the three-factor test "from its real
property moorings and recharacterizing it as a generalized inquiry into
the fundamental fairness of the government action in question," the
opinion in Eastern "easily could serve as the basis for a rejuvenation
of Lochner-like review of economic and social legislation."13' 3 The
wary response to Eastern, like the general unrest with the lack of a
"set formula" for regulatory takings jurisprudence, 4 demonstrates
the need for a set standard for economic, regulatory takings.
Ronald Krotoszynski is just one scholar who criticizes the Supreme
Court for blurring the lines between Due Process and takings in its

129. Id. at 539-40 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part).
130. Id. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
131. See Krotoszynski, supra note 98, at 725-40.
[I]nstead of ordering 'just compensation,' the plurality simply strikes down
the offending statute as unfair or irrational. The Takings Clause is thus
transformed from a specific requirement to compensate persons when
government expropriates property for a public purpose into a generalized
guarantee against the enactment of fundamentally unfair or unjust laws.
Id. at 725.
Perhaps this remedy is not as misguided as suggested. Although normally a
violation of the Takings Clause would require just compensation, such a remedy
seems unreasonable when the property appropriated is money. Krotoszynski does
note that, "[u]nder the logic of Justice O'Connor's approach, the private property at
issue, money or federal reserve notes, having been taken for a 'public use,' triggers an
obligation on the part of the government to provide 'just compensation,' presumably
federal reserve notes of a sort fungible with those taken," but he does not consider
this when questioning the remedy Justice O'Connor proposed. Id. at 732. The
compensation would essentially be the same money that the government
appropriated in the first place, rendering the initial appropriation obsolete.
Therefore, it makes sense to remedy the taking by striking down the statute rather
than by requiring a superfluous just compensation.
132. See id. at 725 (citing 198 U.S. 45, 53-56 (1905) (striking down a statute
regulating the number of hours a baker could work on the grounds that the regulation
unconstitutionally interfered with the right to contract between employers and
employees)); see generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Allure of ConsequentialFit,
51 Ala. L. Rev. 1261, 1262-69 (2000) (arguing that the Takings Clause has been used
to accomplish the goals of Lochner-to strike down economic regulations).
133. Krotoszynski, supra note 98, at 727.
134. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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analysis of Eastern.'35 He argues that a more restrictive test is
necessary to weed out the true takings from those complaints that
sound in due process.13 6 As a remedy, Krotoszynski proposes an
alternative standard-a single inquiry into whether there was
"expropriatory intent," in effect examining whether the government is
regulating the activity solely for the purpose of expropriating the
property without "advanc[ing] a legitimate health, safety, or welfare
'
objective."137
Although this single inquiry would tame what could be
considered the three-headed monster, Krotoszynski's proposal would
prohibit all claims of the misappropriation of money from seeking
relief under the Takings Clause, as all regulations requiring citizens to
give the government money in some sense operate with a welfare
objective.
In fact, Krotoszynski explicitly states that regulations requiring the
payment of money should necessarily be excluded from the takings
regime."' The language of the Takings Clause suggests some form of
exchange-as in property for cash-but when the government takes
citizens' cash, it would be "quite silly" for the government to then turn
around and justly compensate these deprived citizens with cash in
return.13 9 Further, unlike an eminent domain proceeding that "intends
to take and possess a particular thing in order to accomplish a specific
goal," when the government enacts regulations calling for revenue,
the "government is indifferent as to how a taxpayer obtains the funds
to satisfy the obligation .... In these circumstances, the requisite
expropriatory intent is utterly absent.""14 Under this inquiry, because
the citizen can pay the obligated amount with cash, a loan, or "even
[by] sell[ing] the Matisse," the regulation would not be expropriating
specific property, failing to trigger the protection of the Takings
Clause.'
Other scholars do not close out expropriations of money so
generally. While attempting to wade through the mire created by the
muddled case law, several scholars urge a return to the original intent
of the clause. 42 One well-regarded historical account by Dean
William Michael Treanor argues that the original intent of the
135. See supra notes 98, 100 and accompanying text.
136. See Krotoszynski, supra note 98, at 717-19.
137. Id. at 718.
138. Id. at 733. Specifically, Krotoszynski explains:
Although it is true that money, whether in the form of Federal Reserve
notes, bank credits, gold ingots, or Euros, constitutes 'property.' it is quite
silly to consider a general financial obligation to government, such as the
income tax, as a government 'taking' of the funds or credits used to satisfy
the obligation.
Id.
139. Id. at 732-33.
140. Id. at 733.
141. Id.
142. See generally Treanor, supra note 94.

20031

FEE A T LAST?

Takings Clause was to compensate "only in those classes of cases in
which process failure is particularly likely today-when there has been

singling out or in environmental racism cases, where there has been
'
discrimination against discrete and insular minorities."143
In his

"political process theory of the Takings Clause," 1" Treanor argues
that the Takings Clause was originally enacted to protect those
unprotected by the political process.'45 The current victims of process
failure today include those on the fringe of the political process who
are underrepresented, categorized as "discrete and insular
minorities." '46 But the Takings Clause is not meant to protect every
seizure or regulation disadvantaging minorities. Rather, according to
Treanor, the Takings Clause should "'bar Government from forcing

some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."" 47 Although
Treanor's theory narrows the scope of the Takings Clause, it opens
the interpretation of the Takings Clause to include appropriations of

money.
In contrast to the narrow scope posited by Treanor, Richard
Epstein uses history as a springboard for a much more expansive view
of the Takings Clause. 48 In his book Takings, Epstein invokes the
general philosophical

sentiment pervading the time when the

Constitution was adopted-Locke's liberal theory of property-to

evaluate what the Takings Clause should protect.14 9 Believing that the
framers were all Lockeans who were against the redistribution of
wealth, Epstein posits that "[a]ll regulations, all taxes, and all
modifications of liability rules are takings of private property prima
15
facie compensable by the state.""
If the action is a prima facie

taking, Epstein imposes limitations in the form of three questions:
"[I]s this state action justified as an exercise of police power?"'51 If so,
143. Treanor, supra note 94, at 784.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 829. In 1776, the unprotected included the members of the new State of
Vermont, who included a prototypical version of the Takings Clause in their state
constitution. Because Vermont was far from the capital where decisions were made,
"its claims could not be fairly considered," and their Takings Clause was created to
"provide security against the type of process failure to which majoritarian decisionmaking processes were peculiarly prone." Id. at 829, 830. For a much more detailed
description of the history of the Takings Clause, see generally id.
146. Id. at 872-74.
147. Id. at 877 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
148. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent
Domain (1985). This Note presents only a summary of an exceptionally detailed,
well-presented theory espoused in Takings. For an overview of Epstein's theories and
the opposition in response, see Symposium, Richard Epstein's Takings: Private
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 1 (1986).
149. See generally Epstein, supra note 148 at 3-18; see also Treanor, supra note 94,
at 815.
150. Epstein, supra note 148, at 95 (emphasis in original).
151. Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 21, 29
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then the taking is constitutional. If not, is the taking for a legitimate
public use? 152 The final question to address is whether there has been
just compensation.'53
Under the first question, if the state action is necessary to control
fraud or the private use of force, then, according to Epstein, the taking
is permitted.'54 Actions to reduce private harm or fraud are legitimate
uses of police power, including the disarming of a thief or the need to
limit pollution of an industrial plant.'55 Epstein argues that most

zoning laws do not justify the use of police power because they are not
a means to end actual harm.'56 In the event an action is not a
legitimate exercise of police power, then it must satisfy the final two
requirements or else it will be deemed a taking.
The public use and just compensation limitations go hand in hand.'57

Epstein contends that public use is "[a]t a minimum" necessary to
enforce "a strict limitation upon the power of government to take
'
private property."158

Under this analysis, to satisfy the public use

requirement, the government must distribute any surplus it receives

from an appropriation, pro rata, among the population. 5 9 Rather
than allow all appropriations to satisfy the public use requirement if

they benefit even a small population, "[t]he public use limitation helps
curb those abuses, for by controlling the disposition of the surplus it
(1986). For example, "the police power applies when a large group of neighbors
disarm a thief in the neighborhood or limit pollution by an industrial plant." Richard
A. Epstein, An Outline of Takings, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 3, 11 (1986).
152. See Grey, supra note 151. Epstein is frustrated by the modern approach to
this limitation, which all but assumes there is a public use inherent in any
governmental appropriation. Epstein, supra note 148, at 161-62. Despite the growing
trend, the body of law "which trivializes the public use limitation, is incorrect." Id. at
162. Epstein urges a more serious look into the question of when the property is put
to public use because even though "[o]ne could argue that some member of the public
gets some marginal benefit from the activity.., then there is the question why an
ounce of public concern justifies a pound of private taking." Epstein, supra note 151,
at 13.
153. See Grey, supra note 151; see also generally Epstein, supra nbte 148, at 182215. Just compensation is not sufficient if the surplus of a takings action benefits only
a small part of the contributing population. Id.
154. See Epstein, supra note 151, at 11.
155. Id.
156. Id. "Building an ordinary home does not become a nuisance against many
neighbors when it is not a nuisance against any of them individually." Id. That said,
Epstein recognizes that zoning laws enforced to prevent or reduce pollution are
legitimate uses of police power. Id.
157. Epstein first laments the disappearance of the "public use" limitation from the
takings equation, noting how the courts have broadened the scope of public welfare
to include even those activities which benefit a small number of people." Epstein,
supra note 151, at 12-15.
158. Epstein, supra note 148, at 162.
159. Id. at 163. "The sovereign is allowed to take from the citizens only those funds
that are necessary to operate the state. The rest of the surplus subject to that tax lien
should be divided among all citizens, pro rata in accordance with their private
holdings." Id. If it is not distributed pro rata, a taking should be barred.
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limits the scope of partisan activities.

' 16'

Distributing surplus property

pro rata satisfies both the public use and the just compensation
requirement.
With these questions as his guide, Epstein challenges the
constitutionality of taxation, 61 transfer payments, 6 2 and welfare
payments1 63 on the ground that, for the most part, these governmental
programs do not provide equal benefits to those surrendering their
property rights (namely the rich). 164 Epstein does not call for the
outright elimination of these programs, but instead offers alternatives
that, if implemented, could overcome the constitutional challenges to
some degree. 65 As this liberal theory conveniently eliminated the
gray areas of
what constitutes a taking, it came under fire as being too
66
expansive.1

With multiple theories of the scope of the Takings Clause, it is
difficult to predict with certainty when an appropriation merits the
protection of the clause. Despite this uncertainty, this Note moves on
to explain how the work release participation fee falls squarely within
the scope of the Takings Clause as interpreted by courts and scholars.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH THE WORK RELEASE PARTICIPATION FEE
Without the threat of accountability, and without a cap, the twenty
percent fee curtails the rights of work release participants in New

160. Id. at 165.
161. See id. at 99-100, 283-305. "With a tax, the government takes property in the
narrowest sense of the term, ending up with ownership and possession of that which
was once in private hands." Id. at 100. There is clearly no means of calculating
whether a taxpayer receives an equal benefit in return for his taxes. Id. at 297-98. Put
another way, even if one were to say that a taxpayer receives the benefit of
democracy in return for his taxes, how does one quantify the value of democracy to
evaluate whether the taxpayer is justly compensated?
162. See id. at 306-14.
163. See id. at 314-29.
164. See id. at 314-15. "Welfare transfers, whether in cash or in kind, aid the poor
at the expense of the rich." Id. at 314. Epstein highlights the possible benefits that the
rich get in exchange for their contribution to welfare. For example, protection against
"the violence of others who will act in antisocial fashion when these benefits are not
provided" could possibly justify welfare. Id. at 315-16. For a detailed description of
arguments for and against welfare, see id. 314-29.
165. To overcome the problems of taxation, Epstein recommends a "flat tax,"
which will minimize the "expected mismatch of taxes and benefits." Id. at 298. As for
welfare, which provides a private benefit at public expense, Epstein posits the
possibility of "get[ting] out of the welfare business entirely," and instead opts for a
private welfare system driven by charitable contributions. Id. at 322. But no system is
perfect. Id. at 314-29. Overall, Epstein recognizes that "[it is not possible to design a
stable set of institutional arrangements for transfer payments to satisfy the justcompensation requirement of the eminent domain clause." Id. at 324.
166. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 151, at 24 (calling Takings "a travesty of
constitutional scholarship"). Treanor argues that the framers "were not committed to
absolute, liberal protection of property rights." Treanor, supra note 94, at 818.
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York. 167 The fee is supposed to be a reasonable reflection of a specific
inmate's participation in the program, yet it is calculated solely on the
basis of the inmate's wages. Unless the amount of money a work
release

participant

earns

is

an

appropriate

and

reasonable

determination of the costs that the inmate incurs, it is unreasonable to
calculate the fee based on wages. Inmates who earn more in salary

will pay more than inmates who are similarly situated and use the
same facilities but make less money. Even if on average the costs are
reasonably related to twenty percent of a participant's salary, is it fair
to force work release participants with professional jobs and large
salaries to pay higher fees without receiving increased benefits?
Challenges to work release programs abound, but victories are few.
A. When Crime Won't Pay: ChallengingReimbursement Fees
1. Excessive Fines and Double Jeopardy
While reimbursement programs yield significant returns purporting
to ease the burden on taxpayers, they raise several legal and social
concerns. The early objections to the reimbursement fees rested in
the Eighth Amendment "Excessive Fines" Clause and the Fifth
Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause. 68 Courts have consistently
upheld the validity of reimbursement fees in the face of an Excessive
Fine or Double Jeopardy challenge, mainly because reimbursement
fees are not deemed to be fines. 69 In Tillman v. Lebanon County

167. Although this Note focuses on the constitutionality of the statute in New
York, the analysis can be applied to the other states with a similar statutory model.
For example, South Carolina requires "[i]f there are no child support obligations,
then twenty-five percent [of the work release participant's wages] must be used by the
Department of Corrections to defray the cost of the prisoner's room and board." S.C.
Code Ann. § 24-3-40(A)(3) (Law. Co-op. 2000).
168. Under the Eight Amendment "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Fifth Amendment prohibits
any person from being "subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. For an example of how these clauses have been
applied to reimbursement fees, see Auditor Gen. v. Hall, 1 N.W.2d 516, 518 (Mich.
1942) (holding that "the statutory obligation of a prisoner to pay for his keep and
maintenance, if he has a sufficient estate, [is] civil rather than criminal" and thus does
not create double jeopardy).
A reimbursement fee will be considered an "excessive fine" if it is (1) deemed
to be a fine and not a civil payment and (2) the "the particular sanction in question is
so large as to be 'excessive."' Grove v. Kadlic, 968 F. Supp. 510, 516 (D. Nev. 1997)
(citations omitted). The "threshold issue in determining whether a payment is
'punishment' for Double Jeopardy purposes is whether it is 'disproportionate to the
damages caused to the government."' Id. at 518 (citing United States v. Walker, 940
F.2d 442,443 (9th Cir. 1991)).
169. See, e.g., Tillman v. Lebanon County Corr. Facility 221 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2000).
But see Grove, 968 F. Supp. at 520 (holding that the thirty dollar per day fee for room
and board in a Nevada prison was considered a fine but not excessive and thus valid).

2003]

FEE ATLAST?

Correctional Facility,7 ' the Third Circuit refused to consider the

reimbursement fees as fines for several reasons: (1) if the prisoner
failed to pay the fee, his term of incarceration would not be extended;
(2) the fee is not tied to the gravity of the offense but is fixed for each

prisoner; (3) the fee was implemented to teach financial responsibility,
not to punish; (4) the fee offset maintenance, room, and board-costs
that the prisoner would have had to pay even if he had not been
incarcerated. 7 ' Further, even if the fee were deemed a fine, given that
the fee offset only a fraction of the costs incurred by the prison, the
"fine" would hardly be considered excessive.'72

2. Social Concern
The next issue concerns the social impact of imposing fees on
inmates for services, such as medical care, which have "traditionally
been seen as a public responsibility."1 7 3 The NIC responds to this
170. 221 F.3d 410 (2000).
171. Id. at 420.
172. Id.
173. Fees Paid, supra note 1, at 4. Even if prisons do not charge inmates a copayment for medical services, prisons must furnish medical care to its prisoners. In
1976, the Supreme Court decided that prisoners have a constitutional right to receive
medical services while they are incarcerated, as denying them medical attention is
considered a "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The debate over whether the public should
have to pay for inmate medical care reached new heights when a prisoner in Clinton
Correctional Facility in New York, Mark L. Brooks a/k/a Jessica M. Lewis brought an
action against the Assistant Deputy Superintendent at Clinton and others, alleging
they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs as a transsexual, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. Brooks v. Berg, No. 00-CV-1433, 2003 WL 21649735
(N.D.N.Y. July 15, 2003). Brooks claimed to have gender identity disorder ("GID"),
which requires treatment including hormonal replacement, electrolysis, and sex
reassignment surgery. Id. at *2. The administrators at Clinton refused to provide
Brooks with the treatment s/he requested, justifying their actions by referencing the
prison policy that GID treatment is only provided to those inmates who were
diagnosed with GID before they were incarcerated. Id. Judge Kahn stated that
"[pirison officials cannot deny transsexual inmates all medical treatment simply by
referring to a prison policy which makes a seemingly arbitrary distinction between
inmates who were and were not diagnosed with GID prior to incarceration." Id. at *9.
Noting "the numerous cases which hold that prison officials may not deny transsexual
inmates all medical attention, especially when this denial is not based on sound
medical judgment," Kahn refused to grant summary judgment on the issue. Id.
Although Kahn did not order the state to pay for a sex change, the ruling is still a
strong step in a controversial direction.
Another controversial issue to surface is organ transplants and donations to
inmates. In January 2002, a thirty-two year old California prisoner received a heart
transplant that purportedly cost taxpayers one million dollars. Ed Fletcher, Bill Aims
to Limit Organs to Prisoners. The Debate over a Heart Transplant Spurs the Effort to
let Donors Choose, The Sacramento Bee (Jan. 24, 2003), available at
A
http://www.sacbee.com/content/politics/ca/story/5974001p-6932524c.html.
spokeswoman for the Department of Corrections justified the transplant to angry
constituents by explaining that inmates have a constitutional right to "communitylevel health care" and had they refused the transplant the inmate or his estate could
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concern by emphasizing that prisoners should not be absolved from
paying for medical care simply because their criminal behavior put
7 4 The California Medical Association Committee on
them in jail.Y
Corrections and Detention Health Care responded to this dichotomy
by developing guidelines for implementing the inmate medical copayment program. 17 These guidelines request that the "local decision
makers... [k]eep fees low; [i]nstitute a single fee (or entry fee) for
requested services; [w]aive fees for services required or initiated by
correctional staff.., and statute; emergency services; and pregnancy17 6
related services [and] [p]rovide equal care for indigent inmates.'
California also recommended that local jails evaluate the fee system
to determine whether the fees are preventing inmates from seeking
medical care. 177 To minimize the impact of the co-pay, most states
have enacted co-payment schemes only for non-necessary
treatments. 178 The justification behind the co-payments, especially
those for non-necessary treatment, is that a small fee will help deter
frivolous medical visits.

179

As one court noted, this is the objective

behind all medical insurance co-payments, not just those implemented
in prisons. ° With co-pays typically imposed on non-emergency and
prisoner-initiated treatment, and even then only ranging from three to

have sued the prison. Id. In response, a California state senator has proposed
legislation that would allow donors to "check a box indicating their desire to prohibit
their donation from going to a person incarcerated in a state prison or a county jail."
Id. Allowing donors to determine the fate of their organs is unprecedented in donor
history. Typically donor agencies do not look at the social status of the patient when
allocating organs. Jessica Wright, Note, Medically Necessary Organ Transplantsfor
Prisoners: Who is Responsible for Payment? 39 B.C. L. Rev. 1251, 1255-57 (1998)
("Every transplant program, organ procurement organization and tissue-typing
laboratory in the United States is a member of UNOS [United Network for Organ
Sharing] ....
The UNOS ethics committee believes .... that being accused or
convicted of a crime is irrelevant to the selection of transplant recipients."). For a
general overview of the ethical dilemmas of prison organ transplants, see generally id.
174. Fees Paid,supra note 1, at 4.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. This constant review is prudent in light of Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97. If the copayments are preventing indigent prisoners from seeking medical care, the prison
could be violating inmates' constitutional right to medical treatment. See supra note
173 and accompanying text.
178. Johnson v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 885 F. Supp. 817, 818 (D. Md.
1995) (noting that the Maryland statute authorizing prison co-payments "also
provides numerous exceptions to this 'co-pay' policy. For example, no fees may be
assessed for 'necessary treatment"').
179. Fees Paid,supra note 1, at 4; see also Johnson,885 F. Supp. at 820.
180. Johnson, 885 F. Supp. at 821 ("[T]he co-pay system is a prominent feature of
most health insurance policies for precisely the same reasons that it was adopted in
this case -it applies negative reinforcement to the human tendency to overuse those
health care services for which someone else is paying-i.e., the moral hazard
problem.").
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ten dollars
per visit, 8' prisoners have rarely challenged the fees with
182
success.

Another concern arising from the widespread adoption of prison

fees is the plight of the indigent prisoner.183 Most states absolve the

indigent prisoner of medical co-payment fees."8 Again, in California

the committee addressed this concern by requiring "equal care" for
those who cannot afford the fee. 85 Georgia law absolves prisoners
from the medical fee if they have less than ten dollars in their prison

account.

86

Minnesota qualifies its medical co-payment fee "to the

extent the inmate has available funds. ' 187 This kind of exemption
extends beyond medical co-payments; many state statutes also
consider an inmate's ability to pay when dictating the per diem
costs.188
Not all prisons exempt indigent inmates from reimbursement, as
seen in a recent Pennsylvania case.
In Tillman,'189 an inmate
181. See Fees Paid,supra note 1, at 4-5. Prisons in California charge three dollars
per visit, while those in Colorado charge up to ten. Id.
182. See, e.g., Silo v. Ridge, 728 A.2d 394, 401 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (ruling that a
two dollar co-payment was not a violation of prisoner's due process); Bailey v. Carter,
No. 99-4282, 2001 WL 845446 (6th Cir. July 20, 2001) (holding that a three dollar
medical co-pay was not a violation of due process, Eighth Amendment, or the
Takings Clause). But see, e.g., Haskell County v. Sullivan, 9 P.3d 588 (Kan. Ct. App.
2000) (holding that an indigent prisoner is entitled to medical services solely at the
expense of the government). The court in Haskell emphasized the legislative policy in
Kansas, where "the liability for care and maintenance of a prisoner, including medical
expenses, should be the responsibility of the governmental entity whose criminal
statutes the prisoner allegedly violated." Id. at 589 (citations omitted).
183. Prisoners who have no means of income while in prison would then be denied
haircuts and telephone use and would be in debt to the prison for room and board.
The 1995 Prison Litigation Reform Act requires indigent prisoners to pay
significant filing fees if they want to bring an action against the prison in court. 28
U.S.C. § 1914 (a) (2000). But see § 1915 (a),(b) (allowing prisoners to file an affidavit
to qualify for exemption). Although these fees are outside the scope of this Note, it is
worth mentioning that the success of such actions will be even further curtailed now
that prisoners will be responsible for the costs of litigation. For a detailed discussion
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act and its effects on the indigent prison population,
see Julie M. Riewe, The Least Among Us: Unconstitutional Changes in Prisoner
Litigation Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 47 Duke L.J. 117 (1997);
see also Joshua D. Franklin, Three Strikes and You're Out of ConstitutionalRights?
The Prison Litigation Reform Act's "Three Strikes" Provision and its Effect on
Indigents, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 191 (2000). But see Kevin W. King, Prison Litigation
Reform: Impose Court Costs on Prisoners Who File Lawsuits; Authorize Courts to
Order Payment of Defendant's Attorney Fees Incurred in Defending Frivolous
Lawsuits, 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 280 (1996).
184. This is most likely because indigent prisoners can claim that making medical
co-payments prevents them from seeking medical treatment, denying them their
constitutional rights. See supra notes 173, 177 and accompanying text.
185. Fees Paid,supra note 1, at 4.
186. Id. at 5.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 9. In Florida, Texas and California, the economic standing of the
inmates is considered when determining incarceration costs. Id.
189. Tillman v. Lebanon County Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2000).
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incarcerated in the Lebanon County Correctional Facility in
Pennsylvania was charged ten dollars a day for housing costs under
the Cost Recovery Program; however, he could not pay because he
had no funds. 9 ' Rather than waive the fee because the inmate was
indigent, the program instead created a negative account balance, to
be transferred to a collection agency if left unpaid after the prisoner is
released.'9 1 Tillman left the prison over $4,000 in debt." Overall, as
seen above, most facilities across the country make some adjustments
to shelter indigent prisoners from harsh reimbursement fees.
3. Due Process Challenges
Inmates who are not indigent have little hope of relief from unfair
fees. 93
A number of prisoners have tried to challenge harsh
reimbursement fees on the ground that the fees violate substantive
due process rights, but these challenges are typically unsuccessful
because often prisoners cannot satisfy the elements of a due process
claim. 9 4 To show a deprivation of substantive due process, prisoners
must prove that they have a property interest in the item appropriated
and that the statute does not bear "a reasonable relationship to a
permissive legislative objective" and is "discriminatory, arbitrary or
oppressive.' ' 195
Because courts have refused to recognize that prisoners have a
96
constitutionally protected property interest in their wages,'
190. Id. at 414. Tillman was incarcerated from January 30, 1997 until August 21,
1997 and again between October 24, 1997 until finally discharged in July 1998. Id. at
413-14.
191. Id. at 414.
192. Id. As reimbursement programs work towards easing inmates back into
society, some might question the goals of a Cost Recovery Program that purports to
assist inmates but releases them $4,000 in debt. Some might say that inmates like
Tillman get out of jail but are still left in the hole.
193. See, e.g., Solomos v. Jenne, 776 So. 2d 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(challenging the constitutionality of the one-time $10 fee for uniforms and daily $2
processing fee imposed on Florida state prisoners). But see Starr v. Governor, 802
A.2d 1227 (N.H. 2002); supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Ervin v. Blackwell, 733 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1984). But see Schneider v.
Cal. Dep't of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that prisoners did have a
property interest in their wages; ultimately on remand the prisoners were denied their
due process claim). See infra notes 246-66 and accompanying text.
195. Ilkanic v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 705 So. 2d 1371, 1372 (Fla. 1998). The
Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a $50 per day per diem charge
on prison inmates after finding that "imposing a per diem charge on convicted
offenders clearly relates to a permissive legislative objective of reimbursing public
bodies for the costs expended in incarcerating these persons... [and] that the flat
charge of $50 per day is reasonably related to the costs of incarceration." Id. at 137273. See also Ervin, 733 F.2d at 1285 ("The issue therefore is whether Ervin possessed a
protectable property interest-'a legitimate claim of entitlement'-to the full amount
of the salary he earned while enrolled in the program." (citation omitted)).
196. But see Rudolph v. Cuomo, 916 F. Supp. 1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). In Rudolph,
the court recognized that prisoners have a property interest in the wages they earned
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prisoners' attempts to challenge the constitutionality of the
expropriation of prison wages have been largely unsuccessful.19
Absent a state statute creating property rights, prisoners have no basis
for claiming deprivation of property.'9 8 As most states have statutes
creating the programs and authorizing the fees, thus denying a
property right, working prisoners have little or no chance of showing
they are entitled to their wages.'9 9
In general, prisoners cannot prove that the fees imposed are
"arbitrary and irrational. ''2° Per diem fees, medical co-pays, user fees
and program fees all have a legitimate penological interest-they are
implemented to defray costs, defer frivolous medical visits and instill a
sense of responsibility in inmates.20' Courts have rarely, if ever,
for work performed in the prison. The property interest stemmed from section 187 of
New York's Corrections Law, which stipulates "[t]he department of correctional
services shall adopt rules" that "shall provide for the payment of compensation to
each inmate ... based upon the work performed by such inmates." Id. at 1315
(emphasis omitted). This statute, "coupled with the longstanding policy of paying
inmates and the acknowledgement that inmates were owed the wages in question vest
the plaintiffs with some property interest in their wages for work already performed."
Id. at 1316 (citation omitted). Other states and circuits dance around the notion that
prisoners have a property interest in at least some of their wages, but none express the
concept more explicitly than Rudolph.
See, e.g., Ervin, 733 F.2d at 1286
("[R]egulations clearly establish that Ervin can assert no legitimate claim of
entitlement to the full amount of his salary.").
197. See Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir. 2000) ("Indeed, at
common law a convicted felon not only did not have a property right in the product of
his work in prison, but he also forfeited all rights to personal property.").
One understandable reaction to such challenges is that prisoners do not have a
right to work outside of prison, so they should not have a right to even a portion of
their salary. This rationale was rejected in Ervin, 733 F.2d at 1282. Although the trial
court had ruled that the prisoner had no liberty interest in a work release program,
thus no property interest in the wages earned from the program, the Court of Appeals
rejected that analysis. Id. at 1284-85. The court noted a strong difference between a
challenge "denying [the prisoner] entrance or continued participation in the program"
and one that contests "the conditions of the program as they affected his salary. The
issue therefore is whether Ervin possessed a protectable property interest ...to the
full amount of the salary he earned while enrolled in the program." Id. at 1285. The
Ervin court solidified the method of analysis; rather than looking to the statute
authorizing the work release program, courts would need to look to the statute
authorizing the appropriation of the fee. Id. at 1285 -86.
198. See, e.g., Christiansen v. Clarke, 147 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 1998); Ervin, 733 F.2d
at 1286.
199. But see Turner v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 624 F. Supp. 318 (D. Nev.
1985). Even when there was no statute authorizing the collection of a fee for room
and board, the court could not award damages to the prisoner because during the trial
the legislature amended the statute. Id. at 321-22.
200. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537 (1998).
201. Ilkanic v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 705 So. 2d 1371, 1373 (Fla. 1998) (holding
that a fifty dollar flat per diem charge to prisoners is not a violation of the prisoner's
substantive due process rights because "the flat charge of $50 per day is reasonably
related to the costs of incarceration"). See also Auge v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 743 A.2d
315 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (holding that defendant's act of imposing
surcharge on inmate's purchases from the commissary does not violate substantive
due process, relying on the holdings in Christiansen and Ervin); Reynolds v. Wagner,
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invalidated a prison reimbursement fee on the grounds that it violated

a prisoner's substantive due process rights. °2
The one time a court did grant that a surcharge fee was
unconstitutional, it was not on the grounds that it violated due
process, but rather because the fee was a disproportionate tax. 0 3 In

Starr v. Governor,°4 the New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled that a

five percent surcharge on items purchased in the prison commissary
was unconstitutional because it was a tax applied only to prisoners for

the purpose of benefiting a third party-the victim's compensation
fund.2 5 What was remarkable about the court's approach was its
recognition that, "[a]s laudable as victim compensation may be, it is
not appropriate for us to give that purpose any weight in deciding
whether the surcharge is a tax. ' 20 6 Although the plaintiffs in New
Hampshire challenged the constitutionality of the surcharge on the

basis that it was a disproportionate tax and not on the theory that it
violated substantive due process, the ruling still stands out as one of
936 F. Supp. 1216 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (noting institution of medical co-payments does not
violate due process).
202. See Joseph v. Henderson, 834 So. 2d 373 (Fla. Dist. App. 2003) (stating
statute authorizing twenty dollar booking fee upon prisoner's return from appearing
at a habeas corpus hearing violated the prisoner's substantive due process because it
was arbitrary and irrational). Cf Allen v. Leis, 213 F. Supp. 2d 819 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
Allen is another example of a court using creative reasoning to shield prisoners from
harsh fees. When an Ohio prison required a pre-trial detainee to pay a thirty-dollar
"reimbursement fee"-at the time he was brought to prison-the court held that this
fee was a violation of the detainee's substantive due process right. The court's
rationale hinged on the timing:
According to Black's Law Dictionary "to reimburse" means "[t]o pay back,
to make restoration, to repay that expended.... It is undisputed that any
funds exacted from detainees pursuant to the Pay-For-Stay Program is
collected immediately upon the detainee's arrival at the [facility]. It is also
undisputed that the detainee's "obligation" to pay for the cost of being
booked-in cannot be finally determined until after that detainee's
conviction.
Id. at 830.
The court noted emphatically that a program requiring reimbursement for the
costs of each individual inmate's incarceration cannot possibly justify collecting these
fees before the inmate is even incarcerated; there would be no way to know what
costs the inmate incurred. Simple logic, juxtaposed with a close statutory reading,
yielded a favorable victory for the pre-trial detainee.
203. Starr v. Governor, 802 A.2d 1227 (N.H. 2002). In New Hampshire, all taxes
must be distributed equally, so that the burden of the tax is "'proportionate and
reasonable... equal in valuation and uniform in rate, and just....' Taxes must be in
'due proportion, so that each individual's share, and no more, shall fall upon him."'
Id. at 1230 (citations omitted). Although the legislature may impose taxes on
different classes of property, if the classification is "unreasonable or if its purpose is to
discriminate," the tax will be invalidated. Id. A surcharge will be deemed a tax if it is
an "enforced contribution to raise revenue and not to reimburse the state for special
services rendered to a given party." Because the money raised from the surcharge
went to the victim's compensation fund, it was deemed a tax. Id. at 1229.
204. 802 A.2d at 1227.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1229.
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the few where prisoners were protected from a harsh surcharge on the
grounds that the surcharge was discriminatory and thus
impermissible.2 07
However, even the Starr court's narrow understanding of the
surcharge offers little hope for a scrutinizing look into prison fees.
Not only is the ruling limited to the state of New Hampshire, but even
within the state, the ruling would not apply to those surcharges that
directly benefit the prisoners.2 8 Had the state deposited the money in
a "general fund" that would have directly benefited the prisoners, the
surcharge would have been legitimate. 20 9 The rationale of a "direct
benefit" has fueled numerous court decisions, particularly when
various reimbursement fees were challenged on the basis of the
Takings Clause, which requires just compensation for any personal
property appropriated.210 Courts have qualified benefits, or "just
compensation," in a number of ways, from the existence of a general
fund which offsets costs to the state to direct benefits of services and
prison improvements.2 1
In Washlefske v. Winston,2 12 the Fourth
Circuit held that the appropriation of the interest on inmates' prison
accounts did not violate the Takings Clause because, among other
things, the director could use the interest for the "benefit of the
prisoners under his care. '213 At the prison where Washlefske was
207. Id. The tax was only imposed on items sold in prison commissaries; the same
goods sold outside of prisons were not subject to the tax. Reasoning that there is
nothing special about the goods sold in the prison to warrant a surcharge, and "[n]o
legitimate reason has been presented to create this distinction... such a classification
is impermissible." Id. at 1230.
The novelty of the Starr decision is apparent when compared to cases
involving similar fees. In Auge v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 743 A.2d 315 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2000), the New Jersey Superior Court ruled that a similar ten percent
surcharge on items purchased in the prison commissary was constitutional on the
grounds that it did not violate substantive due process. Even though the revenue
from the surcharge was given to the victim's compensation fund, and the court itself
characterized the surcharge as a "special sales tax," they nevertheless held that the
surcharge was constitutional. Id. at 319. Later, in Myrie v. Commissioner, 267 F.3d 251
(3d Cir. 2001), the court held that a ten percent surcharge on commissary purchases
was constitutional. It seems that the recent Starr decision is either going to usher in a
new era or is an anomaly. Given the tendency for courts to rule in favor of DOCS
and not the prisoners, Starr certainly stands out. This Note encourages courts to take
a closer look into work release participation fees to ensure that they are
constitutional.
Starr approached this question from the perspective of a
disproportionate tax prohibited by the New Hampshire state constitution. This Note
seeks to address the problem under the auspices of the Takings Clause.
208. Id. at 1227. The court reasoned that, "a reimbursement measure for the
services performed," where the "parties responsible for paying the [surcharge]
benefited directly from those services," categorically was not a tax and was perfectly
valid. Id. at 1230.
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 181 (quoting Virginia's statute).
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incarcerated, that interest was used specifically to "purchase library
books, newspaper and magazine subscriptions, exercise equipment,
items for family visiting day, and other 'extras."'2 14 Because the
prisoners ultimately benefited from the interest collected, the
appropriation was not a violation of the Takings Clause.215
But what would happen if the fees exacted were substantial and did
not directly benefit the prisoners? If prisoners have a property
interest in these fees and they were not justly compensated for any
appropriations by the prison, then the prison violated the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 16 Prisoners who have challenged
state prison reimbursement programs on the grounds that these fees
violate the Takings Clause have not yet succeeded, 217 despite the fact
that many prisons do not deposit the funds from the programs in a
manner that directly benefits the prisoners. 218 Even more, the work
release participation fee has yet to come under the scrutiny of the
Takings Clause.21 9
B. Work Release Challenges
As the work release participation fees gained in popularity, cases
challenging their constitutionality grew in number. A few prisoners
have attempted to challenge the fees on the grounds that they violated
their substantive due process rights, but every court has thus far
upheld the validity of participation fees.

214. Id.
215. See generally id.
216. The Takings Clause states that "private property [shall not] be taken for
public use without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V.
217. See, e.g., Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 179; Schneider v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 151
F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Dean v. Lehman, 18 P.3d 523 (Wash. 2001). Schneider was
the closest to come to some recognition of a right. There, the Ninth Circuit held that
despite an unambiguous statute in the California Penal Code, authorizing the state to
"deposit the interest or increment accruing on [prisoners' account from wages earned
in prison] in the Inmate Welfare Fund," a prisoner has a property interest in his wages
and thus the following interest, which could sustain a takings claim. Schneider, 151
F.3d at 1196. On remand, the District Court failed to find a sufficient loss in the
interest to sustain a takings claim. Schneider v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 91 F. Supp. 2d
1316 (N.D. Cal. 2000). The Fourth Circuit failed to apply this ruling in Washlefske,
and the trend of denying the takings challenge continues. See infra notes 246-78 and
accompanying text.
218. Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 260 (2d Cir. 1996). Funds collected from the
surcharge imposed are deposited in the state general fund and not specifically
allocated to the DOCS budget. Id. at 260.
219. Although the prisoners in Turner did challenge the employment fee, there was
no statutory authority for it whatsoever. Turner v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Commr's,
624 F. Supp. 318 (D. Nev. 1985). Once the Nevada legislature amended the statute,
the court did not find the need to further examine the merits of the takings claim. See
supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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1. Due Process Challenges

One of the earliest cases to examine the constitutionality of the
work release participation fee, Ervin v. Blackwell,22° established that a
prisoner only has a property interest in his prison salary in so far as it
is authorized by statute. 2 1 Ervin was an inmate under the control of
the Missouri Division of Corrections ("MDOCS") from 1969 to 1979.
From 1976 until his release, he participated in the work release
program and was employed as a computer operator.2 22 After five
months in the program the MDOCS began to deduct "maintenance
costs" from his salary. 223 By the time Ervin was released, the state had
deducted $7,983.63 from his total salary of $33,857.58.24
Ervin
challenged the deduction, claiming that it deprived him of his property
without due process of law.2 25 The Eighth Circuit upheld the ruling
that the deductions did not violate due process on the grounds that
the Director of MDOCS was granted broad authority under Missouri
Revised Statute section 216.115(3) to "make such rules and
regulations, not in conflict with the laws of this state, as he may deem
proper for the government and management of the institutions under
the jurisdiction of the division. ' 2 26 This statute authorizes the work
release program, and also establishes the right for the prison to
condition participation in the program on a payment of a fee
determined by a sliding scale. 22' The court held that because the
statute authorized the payment of maintenance costs, "[t]hese
regulations clearly establish that Ervin can assert no legitimate claim
of entitlement to the full amount of his salary" and, as such, "[t]here is

220. 733 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1984).
221. Id. at 1286.
222. Id. at 1284.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1285 (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 216.115(3) (1978) (repealed in 1982)).
227. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 216.115(3) (1978). The old statute provided that, "the inmate
is willing to pay all or part of his maintenance costs if his income from working is
sufficient, as determined by the slide scale attached to this policy." Ervin, 733 F.2d at
1285. The current statute requires that
"[e]ach offender on work release shall pay a percentage of his wages,
established by department rules, to a maximum of the per capita cost of
offender support per month, to the department as maintenance. The money
received from the inmate shall be deposited in the inmate fund and shall be
expended pursuant to section 217.430."
Mo. Rev. Stat § 217.435(2) (2001). Section 217.430 provides, in part, that the fee
exacted be "to a maximum amount not to exceed the average daily per capita costs
for maintenance of all persons committed to the department during the previous fiscal
year." The money is deposited in an "Inmate Fund," which is then used, "to support
offenders in education programs, drug treatment programs, residential treatment
facilities, other community-based sanctions, electronic monitoring, or in work or
educational release programs." Id.
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simply 'no interest.., for process to protect.' ' 22s Without a property
interest in his salary, Ervin could not claim the state took his property
without due process.229
Although the Eighth Circuit was correct in looking to the statute to
find an authority for a property interest, its analysis was not thorough
enough, rendering its holding flawed. The court ambiguously noted
that Ervin did not have a "legitimate claim of entitlement to the full
amount of his salary," never denying or asserting whether Ervin had a

property interest in a portion of his salary that may mistakenly have
been appropriated by the prison.23 The statute only authorized the
231
payment of maintenance costs, "as determined by the slide scale.

According to the slide scale, the more money a participant earns, the
more he must pay in maintenance costs. While the court asserted that
"carrying out [the payment of maintenance costs] is hardly an
'arbitrary

action

of government'

demanding

of

due

process

protection," it never weighed the arbitrary action of charging some
.prisoners-those who earn more money-a higher fee for what is
essentially equal service.232 A more thorough opinion would have
included an inquiry into the constitutionality of the slide scale system
when calculating the fee under the statute.

The Eighth Circuit had an opportunity to revisit the question of the
work

release

participation

fee

in

Christiansen v.

Clarke.23 3

Christiansen, a former inmate in the Community Corrections Center
in Lincoln, Nebraska, participated in the work release program for
nine months, and upon his release, the prison withdrew $2,790 from

his account to cover the costs of his room and board. 234 Like Ervin,
Christiansen also challenged the deductions on the grounds that the
prison deprived him of his property without due process. The Eighth
Circuit upheld the opinion of the district court, affirming that the
228. Ervin, 733 F.2d at 1286 (citation omitted).
229. Id. Although Ervin lost, the court did give prisoners one small victory by
rejecting the harsh analysis of the lower court. The court maintained that they
"cannot agree with the district court that the issue presented is whether Ervin
possessed a liberty interest in the work release program;" rather, the proper analysis
is to question whether the prisoner had a property interest in the wages he earned. Id.
at 1284. The former inquiry narrowed the possibility of a successful challenge, as it is
almost impossible for a prisoner to show he has a "constitutional right to work
release," as the test necessitates. Ervin v. Blackwell, 585 F. Supp. 680, 683 (W.D. Mo.
1983) ("Plaintiff's constitutional rights were not violated when his participation in the
program was conditioned upon a maintenance payment because he had no
constitutional right entitling him to participate in the program."). In choosing the
latter inquiry, the court effectively widened the opportunity for recovery. Proving
that a prisoner has a property interest in at least some of his wages is more probable
than proving a prisoner has a constitutional right to work release.
230. Ervin, 733 F.2d at 1286 (emphasis added).
231. Id. at 1285.
232. Id. at 1286 (citation omitted).
233. 147 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 1998).
234. Id. at 657.
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239

former inmate "had no property interest in the wages that he earned
while on work-release. 2 35
Again, the court relied on the
authorization gleaned from a state statute; Nebraska Annotated
Statutes sections 83-184(3) "gives the director of correctional services
the authority to collect from work release inmates 'such costs incident
to the person's confinement as the Director of Correctional Services
deems appropriate and reasonable.' 23 6 Coupled with the statute, the
fact that the inmate's participation in the work release program was
"voluntary, and because he exchanged a portion of his otherwise
protected salary for participation in that program," the court was
convinced that Christiansen did not have a property right to the full
amount of his salary. 37
Although the Christiansen court stood by its ruling in Ervin and
maintained that Christiansen did not have a property interest in the
full amount of his wages, the court seemed reluctant to rule that the
inmate had no recourse available. 238 The court posited, "[i]f the prison
violated state law by deducting funds for unauthorized expenses, then
Mr. Christiansen may file a suit for conversion. '239 By drawing
attention to the deductions from an inmate's salary that perhaps do
not fall into the category of "appropriate and reasonable," the Eighth
Circuit offered the inmates more hope of protection that the earlier
Ervin court.
Although the court did not further analyze the
possibilities of bringing a due process claim alleging that the director
deducted funds for unauthorized expenses, the Christiansen opinion is
more thorough in its analysis then the Ervin opinion.
These are two of the very few cases challenging the work release
participation fee on the grounds that it is a violation of due process;
both have proven unsuccessful. Inmates need another means of
protecting their rights, and perhaps that alternative method can be
found in the Takings Clause. Work release participants have yet to
challenge excessive participation fees using the Takings Clause, but
that may be all the more reason to try.
2. Takings
The confused body of takings law intersects with work release in the
area of the interest earned on prison accounts funded by prison wages.
In Schneider v. California Department of Corrections240 and
Washlefske v. Winston,24' two courts, using opposite analyses,
235. Id.
236. Id. (quoting Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 83-184(3) (1998)).
237. Id.
238. Christiansen,147 F.3d at 657.
239. Id.
240. 91 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Cal. 2000), on remand from Schneider v. Cal. Dep't
of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
241. 234 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000).
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concluded that prisoners are not entitled to the interest earned on

their accounts. In Schneider, the Ninth Circuit held that interest on
prison accounts belonged to the prisoners, but on remand the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California held that
nevertheless the inmates were not entitled to the amount accrued. In
Washlefske, the Fourth Circuit held that the interest belongs to the

state.242 Not surprisingly, neither opinion developed a concrete test
for takings as applied to prison accounts.2 43
Following on the heels of Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 24 Schneider,
on remand from the Ninth Circuit, applied the three-factor test to
uphold a California statute that denied inmates the interest accruing
on their prison accounts. 45 Inmates of Pelican Bay State Prison in

California brought an action against the California Department of
Corrections ("CDOCS"), alleging that the defendant violated the
Takings Clause when it failed to pay the inmates the interest on their
Inmate Trust Accounts ("ITAs"). 24 6 The first issue, whether there was

a private property interest in the interest accrued, was resolved by the

Using the reasoning that "interest... follows
Ninth Circuit. 47
principal," the Ninth Circuit found that the inmates did have a

property interest in the amount accrued on their accounts because
they had a property interest in their principal accounts. 48 This
249
property right existed despite the existence of a state statute
explicitly granting the director of CDOCS permission to take the
Unsettled by
interest and deposit it in an Inmate's Welfare Fund.

242. For a full discussion of these two cases, see infra notes 245-78 and
accompanying text.
243. Given the muddled and sparse case law, this Note uses the scholarly work of
William M. Treanor to show that applying the Takings Clause to a work release
participation fee would be consistent with the original intent of the framers. See supra
note 94 and accompanying text.
244. 524 U.S. 498 (1998). Notably, Schneider never mentions Eastern in the
decision.
245. Schneider, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1323-25.
246. Inmates had the option to place their earnings in either an Inmate Trust
Account or a Passbook Savings Account. The former did not earn interest for the
prisoners and the latter did. The inmates were not charged a fee for the maintenance
of the account. Id. at 1319.
247. Schneider v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1998).
248. Id. at 1199 (citing Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998)). This
holding created a circuit split between the Fourth and the Ninth Circuits. The Fourth
Circuit held that interest earned on prison accounts was not deemed to be the
property of the inmates because they had no property interest in the principal-which
was comprised of the wages earned from work done in prison. Washlefske v.
Winston, 234 F.3d 179, 185-86 (4th Cir. 2000). See infra notes 267-80 and
accompanying text.
249. Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1195. California's Penal Code stipulates that, "[tihe
director shall deposit the interest or increment accruing on such funds in the Inmate
Welfare Fund." Cal. Penal Code § 5008 (West 2003). The Inmate Welfare fund "is
used to improve prison conditions and provide prisoner programs, such as movies and
library materials." Schneider,91 F. Supp at 1319.
250. Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1199 ("Although an explicit statutory provision may

2003]

FEE AT LAST?

the possibility that a state could transform private property into public

property through a properly crafted statute, the court was firm in its
decision that the prisoners possessed a property right to their
interest.251 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court
to determine whether "interest actually accrues on the prisoners' ITA
funds," and if so, whether they could proceed with their Takings
Clause claims.252

On remand, the district court ruled that the appropriation was not a
violation of the Takings Clause. 253 The court used the three-factor
test, looking at the economic impact, the interference with the
plaintiff's investment-backed expectations and the character of the
governmental action.2 "4 The district court found that in withholding

the interest, the statute did not have a significant economic impact on
the inmates. First, CDOCS estimated that the interest earned on the
accounts would come out to an average of four dollars owed to each
prisoner, but that amount would be subsumed by the expense of
running such a program.2 5
"[R]ough" estimates of the costs of
operating the ITAs, estimated at around one million dollars annually,
evidenced that the costs "clearly exceed the amount of interest which
individual prisoners would receive if interest" were paid to them. 6
Because CDOCS offered a valuable service to the prisoners free of
charge, the inmates could not prove that "the lack of interest income
operate[d] to prisoners' overall economic detriment. '257 According to
the court, the economic impact of the regulation actually helped the
inmates rather than hurt them.258
In analyzing the investment-backed expectations of the prisoners,
the district court reasoned that the inmates had a choice to place their
money either in an interest bearing account ("Passbook Savings
Accounts") or a non-interest bearing account ("ITA"). 259 Because the
prisoners freely chose the latter account, they could not now argue
that they "expected to earn interest on the money deposited in their
indeed be a sufficient condition to the creation of a constitutionally cognizable
property interest.., it assuredly is not a necessary one." (citations omitted)).
251. Id. at 1200-01.
252. Id. at 1201.
253. Schneider, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1316.
254. Id. at 1321-26.
255. Id. at 1321.
256. Id. at 1323 n.6.
257. Id. at 1324. The prisoners argued that the defendant's estimates were
"speculative and unreliable" but they were unable to offer estimates of their own.
Their only argument was the Oregon Department of Corrections ("ODOCS") had a
similar program, but it did administer the interest to prisoners. Unable to provide the
data for the ODOCS program either, the prisoners had no basis upon which to argue
economic detriment. Id. at 1323-24.
258. Id. at 1325 ("Therefore, the Court concludes that application of the interest
earned on excess ITA funds to the use of the Inmate Welfare Fund provided plaintiffs
with a benefit rather than an unwarranted burden.").
259. Id. at 1324.
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ITAs. '26 ° Furthering the analysis, the district court also returned to
the issue of subsumed costs. "[A]ny investment expectations plaintiffs
may have would not be met by the institution of an interest-bearing
ITA system," because the costs of running the system would so
outweigh the interest generated.2 1 Because the inmates were aware
that their accounts would not generate enough interest to cover the
costs of running such a system, they could not claim that they
expected any money in return.2 62
On the final issue, the character and benefit of the governmental
action, the court again focused on the minimal return. 263 Reasoning
that this benefit would be swallowed by the cost of the program itself,
the court had trouble qualifying the regulation as a detriment to the
prisoners. 2 4 Additionally, the fact that the prisoners themselves
benefited from the pooled interest, "rather than transferring the
benefits to a population outside of the prison" was enough evidence
for the court to conclude that the application of the interest to the
Inmate Welfare Fund provides the plaintiffs with a benefit and not a
1
burden.265
As such, the statute was not deemed to be a violation of
the Takings Clause.266
Immediately following the lower court's ruling in Schneider, the
Fourth Circuit faced a similar question in Washlefske v. Winston
concerning an inmate who was in the custody of the Virginia
Department of Corrections ("VDOCS"). 267 In 1992, Washlefske
earned an average of $108.76 per month for his work in prison and
had that income credited to a prison "spend account" run by the State
Board of Corrections.2 68 Under the regulations that govern the
maintenance of this bank account, the Director of the VDOCS was
authorized to use, at his discretion, funds that were "not needed to
meet the immediate requests of the prisoners.., for the benefit of the
prisoners under his care. "269 Washlefske argued that the State used
the interest from these accounts without giving him just compensation
in violation of the Takings Clause. 27 ° The U.S. District Court for the
260. Id. at 1325. Although the Passbook Savings Account earns interest, there are
certain limitations placed on the use of the account. Prisoners do not have access to
the Canteen with the passbook, while they do with their ITAs. Id. at 1324-25.
261. Id. at 1325.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000).
268. Id. at 181.
269. Id. (quotation omitted).
270. Id. at 182. Although Washlefske does not concern the question of work
release, its analysis of an inmate's property interest in his prison salary, coupled with
the analysis of the Takings Clause and monetary appropriations is especially relevant
to the argument that the work release fee is a violation of the Takings Clause. For a
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Eastern District of Virginia ultimately used the three-factor test to
conclude that the appropriation of the interest did not violate the
Takings Clause.2 1 Because Washlefske and the other prisoners
ultimately benefited directly from the interest taken, the court
rejected the contention that there was an appropriation for public use
that had an adverse effect on the prisoners.27 2 At the prison where
Washlefske was incarcerated, the interest on the pooled incomes was
used specifically to "purchase items such as library books, newspaper
and magazine subscriptions, exercise equipment, items for family
visiting day, and other collectively used 'extras. ' ' 27 3 The court found
'274
this to be sufficient evidence of "just compensation.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit revisited the question of whether
Washlefske had a property interest in the wages he earned while in
prison. 27 5 Because under traditional rules of property law in Virginia,
''an inmate has no property interest in any 'wages' from his work in
prison except insofar as the State might elect, through statute, to give
him rights," the court turned to a statute.2 76 The court found that the
applicable statute, Virginia Code section 53.1-44, "create[d] limited
rights to funds given to prisoners for work performed while serving
their prison terms. '277 This limited right did "not give him full
rights.., over the amounts 'earned' and credited to his accounts. '278
Without a property right to the full amount, Washlefske could not
satisfy the requisite foundation for a takings claim: the need for a
property interest.279 Washlefske patently rejected the Ninth Circuit's
contention that prisoners have a property right to their accounts
funded by their wages, further constricting any available recourse for
prisoners.280 Part III attempts to expand on an available recourse for
prisoners using the Takings Clause as a means of relief.
III. A NOVEL CHALLENGE TO THE WORK RELEASE PARTICIPATION
FEE

In the cases above, the inmates ultimately received the benefit of
the contested property, whether it was in the form of a library for
their prison, magazine subscriptions or a free accounting system.281
more detailed discussion of the recent treatment of the Takings Clause and monetary
appropriations, see supra notes 104-34 and accompanying text.
271. Washlefske v. Winston, 60 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541-43 (E.D. Va. 1999).
272. Id. at 542-43.
273. Id. at 536.
274. Id. at 542.
275. Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000).
276. Id. at 185.
277. Id.
278. Id. (quoting Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998)).
279. Id. at 185-86.
280. Id. at 186.
281. See supra notes 241-78 and accompanying text.
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282
Like Starr,
Schneider suggested that, had the money not directly
benefited the prisoners, the appropriations might have met a different
fate. 283 This speculation leaves open the possibility that if inmates can
provide data as to the expenses and returns of prison programs to
prove that the expenses do not match their fees, courts could be
compelled to find a violation of the Takings Clause.2 8
In both Schneider and the district court opinion in Washlefske, the
courts focus their takings analysis on the quality of the property
itself. 85 The source of the money, the amount of money appropriated,
and its ultimate end were all crucial to the final rulings. Although
Schneider and Washlefske employed the three-factor test in their
respective takings analysis, the same point was used to avert each
factor: The interest was a paltry sum and seemingly did not outweigh
the costs of managing the program.286 In the event that a prison
regulation appropriates a significant sum-one that outweighs cost
and does not return the benefit to the prisoners in some alternate
form-perhaps the courts would recognize a takings claim. Such a
scenario exists under New York's work release participation fee.

A. Looking at New York's Fee Under the Three-Factor Test
If New York Correction Law section 860 and NYCRR section
1903.2(f)(3) were challenged under the Takings Clause, the statute
and regulation would not survive the scrutiny of the three-factor test.
Using a work release participant prisoner who earns $50,000 a year as
a model,2 87 this section examines the fee under each factor, ultimately
concluding that the statute would fail to survive this test.
282. 802 A.2d 1227 (N.H. 2002). See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
283. Schneider v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1326 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
Even more so than Starr,the court in Schneider hinged its decision on the existence of
a "benefit" to the prisoners. Id. at 1320, 1324-26. The opinion is rife with references
to the individual and collective benefit: "[The] system provides plaintiffs with a
valuable service at no charge," then later, "the pooling of interest earned in the IWF
offered plaintiffs benefits that each individual prisoner's interest-were it
distributed-would not be able to provide." Id. at 1323-25. As the cost-benefit
analysis constitutes most of the takings analysis, if such a benefit did not exist the
court would have had no reason to deny the takings claim.
284. One theme reverberating throughout the Schneider opinion is the lack of cost
estimates of the ITA program. Id. at 1323 ("Plaintiffs have not presented evidence
countering or challenging defendant's cost estimates or showing that the cost to
defendants in accounting for the funds in each inmates' [sic] ITA is not substantial, or
that the offering of this service is not useful and valuable to plaintiffs.").
285. See supra notes 252-62, 267-68 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 256-79 and accompanying text.
287. This scenario is entirely likely; consider the paralegal at the large New York
law firm introduced in the opening hypothetical. This Note was inspired by the
grievance of a work release participant currently in the custody of a New York
correctional facility, who is a paralegal employed by a large law firm in New York.
The inmate earned $37,000 net in the past year and paid almost $7,500 in fees to
DOCS. Next year his salary will increase, leaving him to pay more in fees than costs
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1. Economic Impact

The first factor to examine is the economic impact of the twenty
percent fee. Losing twenty percent of net salary would have a
significant economic impact on the prison wage earner. The work
release participant making $50,000 per year would have to give DOCS
$10,000 to cover the costs of room and board incurred for twenty
hours a week, plus administrative costs.
Even though the inmate would pay DOCS $10,000, the economic
loss must be measured by the amount he pays over and above the
actual value of the services he receives. In Schneider, the court
calculated the economic impact by looking at the value of the interest
accrued subtracted from the value of the program that generated the
interest. 8 Because the cost to run the program far outweighed the
interest accrued per prisoner, which was four dollars a year, the court
held that there was no negative economic impact.289 DOCS reported
that it costs $7,500 per inmate per year to run the work release
program. 290 This participant, then, is paying $10,000 for only $7,500
worth of services. The true economic impact of the twenty percent fee
is a negative $2,500. A loss of over two thousand dollars, even after
the inmate covers his cost of the program, is significant enough to
withstand the inquiry into economic impact.
2. Investment-backed Expectations
To measure the investment-backed expectations of the inmate,
courts such as in Schneider have required a look into the expectations
of the inmate at the time they entered into the program to see if the
inmate was aware of the appropriation.2 9 1 This factor is difficult to
satisfy at the prisoner level, as every potential work release participant
must sign a contract requiring him or her to pay the twenty percent
fee before they begin the program. The inmate could not have
expected to collect more than eighty percent of their wages when they
joined the program.
The inmate could argue, however, that he did not have an adequate
alternative to signing the contract and giving up his wages. 292 Either
he would be forced to give the twenty percent fee or he would not be
Given the substantial
allowed to participate in the program.
difference in quality of life that the work release program affords over

that he incurs as a prisoner.
288. See supra notes 255-58 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
290. DOCS 2001 Report, supra note 9, at 10.
291. See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
292. Inmates tried to do the same in Schneider v. California Department of
Corrections., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1324-25 (N.D. Cal. 2000), but failed.
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prison, it seems unfair to deem the alternative of remaining a full-time
prisoner an equal choice.
As another possible argument, the inmate could contend that he
expected the full twenty percent of his salary to go towards room,
board, and administrative costs. His expectations have not been met
because DOCS is only applying seventy five percent of his $10,000 to
the expected program costs. The remaining $2,500 is thus being used
in an unexpected manner. Although this argument has not been
tested in court, when coupled with the above contention that the
inmate has no alternative, it could be sufficient evidence of an
investment-backed expectation.
3. Character and Benefit of the Governmental Action
The twenty percent fee does in some ways benefit the prisoners,
calling into question whether this third factor can be satisfied.
According to the 2001 report, the 5,960 work release participants in
New York paid a total of $456,366 in "support and maintenance
payments. '293 When the expenses and incomes are averaged together,
the participants' payments fall short of the overall costs of maintaining
the program. But those work release participants who earn more than
$50,000 a year, and therefore pay more than $7,500 in fees, pay above
and beyond the actual costs they incur.29 a As these inmates pay above
and beyond the costs they actually incur, they do seem to carry an
"unwarranted burden. ' 295 This burden is the direct result of a fee
based on a percentage of salary, and not a flat fee accurately reflecting
the administrative costs.
The fee also fails to "benefit" inmates. Unlike the inmates in
Schneider or Washlefske, the inmates in New York State Prisons do
not "directly" benefit from their twenty percent fees. The money is
deposited in a state general fund which does not entirely benefit the
prisoners.2
This system can "transfer[] the benefits to a population
outside of the prison, 2 97 hardly qualifying as a benefit to the inmates.
B. Possible Opposition
The current takings analysis has been criticized on a number of
levels, mainly on the grounds that the application of the clause is far
293. DOCS 2001 Report, supra note 9, at tbl.1.
294. It does not seem unlikely for a work release participant employed in New
York to earn above $37,500 net salary per year.
295. Schneider, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1325.
296. New York State Department of Correctional Services, Inmate Fees Collection
Nears $12M in Seven Years, DOCS Today 9 (May 2002) [hereinafter DOCS Today]
(noting that "the vast majority of [the work release] proceeds being funneled into the
state general fund" have resulted "in some big financial benefits.., for thousands of
crime victims and New York state taxpayers").
297. Schneider, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1325.

2003]

FEEATLAST?

too broad.29 8 Critics may argue that challenging a work release
participation fee using the Takings Clause would further broaden the
scope of the amendment, but even under the criticisms and proposed
revisions to the "takings regime, 2 99 the work release participation fee
would still be suspect under the Takings Clause.
For example, although Krotoszynski seemingly bars most forms of
economic regulations from a takings inquiry, 3" work release
participation fees withstand his revised test. Because the state deducts
the fee directly from the participant's account, which is funded only by
work release wages, the state clearly targets "a particular thing in
order to accomplish a specific goal."3 °1 There is no indifference here
to the method of payment, as there could be with most economic
regulations or taxes. The work release participants could not pay the
obligated fee with other sources of cash. Clearly the regulation
possesses some "expropriatory intent" as defined by Krotoszynski. °2
Further, Krotoszynski's test is premised on the theory that
"'expropriatory intent' exists only when a government acts to possess
property via conduct that, at the time the Framers drafted and ratified
the Bill of Rights, would constitute a taking," thus imploring a look
into the historical intent of the Takings Clause." 3 In looking to the
historical underpinnings of the Takings Clause, it seems likely that
work release participation fees would fall within its original intent.
Work release participation fees seem to fit inside the framework as
proscribed by Treanor.3" It is possible to characterize prisoners as a
"discrete and insular" minority requiring the protection of the early
Takings Clause.30 Prisoners are certainly underrepresented in the
political process." For the last six years New York Assemblyman
McLaughlin has proposed a bill calling for a more3 fair
percentage fee,
and for the last six years the bill has been rejected. 7
298. See Treanor, supra note 94, at 782 (arguing that the original intent of the
framers was of a "limited scope"); see also Krotoszynski, supra note 98, at 715
(criticizing the recent case law which has "defined the scope of the Takings Clause in
ever-broader terms, effectively transforming a protection against uncompensated
eminent domain actions into a general-purpose guarantor of any and all private
property rights").
299. Treanor, supranote 94, at 782.
300. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
301. Krotoszynski, supra note 98, at 733.
302. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
303. Krotoszynski, supra note 98, at 768.
304. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
305. Doretha M. Van Slyke, Note, Hudson v. McMillian and Prisoners'Rights: The
Court Giveth and the Court Taketh Away, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1727, 1727 (1993)
(noting that "[p]risoners have been described as the starkest example of a 'discrete
and insular minority"' (citation omitted)).
306. Andrew L. Shapiro, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the
Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 Yale L.J. 537, 538 (1993) ("Currently, all but
three states deprive incarcerated offenders of the vote .....
307. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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As for Treanor's second factor,3" 8 it may be difficult to argue that
the burden of supporting prisoners and maintaining a prison is a
public burden that, in all fairness, should be borne by the public and
not the prisoners themselves. But on another level, the work release
participants who earn a substantial income are forced to support other
work release participants who earn less, indigent prisoners or simply
non-working prisoners across the state.3 °9 If twenty percent of a
participant's salary is more than the cost he incurs as an inmate, then
he effectively pays more than his share of the burden. The twenty
percent scheme leaves a vulnerable minority open to exploitation.
The track record for successful work release fee challenges in general,
as outlined above, evidences the courts' reluctance to protect
prisoners.3 10
Not surprisingly, the work release participation fee would also be
considered a taking under Epstein's construction of the clause.31 ' The
need to collect money to offset the costs of the prison program is
certainly not a legitimate exercise of the police power, as it does not
protect against a harm. The next inquiry then, is whether the fee is
put towards public use, and if so, whether the payor is justly
compensated. Under Epstein's construction of public use and just
compensation, the fee would necessarily fail. Although a portion of
the fee is used to benefit the prisoners, the "surplus"-the amount
above and beyond the actual cost of administration-is not distributed
pro rata among the prisoners.3 1 Those prisoners who pay more in
fees could be likened to Epstein's taxpayers in a higher bracket who
pay more in taxes, but then do not get an increase in services from the
government.3 3 Epstein proposed the use of a flat tax to eliminate the
need to equitably divide the surplus among the different taxpayers.3 1 a
While this solution is improbable for government taxes, it is entirely
feasible in the realm of the work release participation fee, as shown
below.
C. Cap Me if You Can
It may be a while before the fee is challenged in the courtroom.
Before the state incurs the time and expense of a lengthy trial,
legislators can amend the statute to remedy the violation.3 15 For the
308. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
309. As their administrative fees are dumped into a state general fund, the money
is used to offset costs across the state. DOCS Today, supra note 296, at 9.
310. See supra Part II.B.
311. See supra notes 148-66 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
313. See Epstein, supra note 148, at 163.
314. See id. at 298; see supra note 165 and accompanying text.
315. As seen in Turner,legislators often amend problematic statutes before a judge
can invalidate them. Turner v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 624 F. Supp 318 (D.
Nev. 1985); see supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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past six years, the same New York State Assemblymen have proposed
the same amendments to section 860, calling for some type of
reform.3 16 The proposed amendment eliminates most of the problems
posed by the current law, mainly because it imposes a fee capped at
$100 per week.317 The maximum amount the directors could collect
from work release participants would be $5,200, well below the $7,500
it costs to run the program.
Because the corrections committee has yet to approve the changes,
there is room for improvement on the proposed amendment. The
New York Assembly should amend section 860 or NYCRR section
1903.2(f)(3) in either of two ways to avoid potential violations of the
Takings Clause. The fee should be calculated (1) on a per diem basis
or (2) as a percentage with a maximum capped at $7,500 for the
year-the cost per inmate to run the program. A per diem fee would
accurately reflect the administrative, room and board costs that each
inmate incurs. A percentage capped at a maximum fee would allow
the prison to collect fees that are appropriate and reasonable.
1. Calculating Per Diem
If the administrator of the program were required to calculate the
exact costs of room, board and administering the program, there
would be little concern that the fee would be unfair for individual
prisoners. Given the nature of the program, which allows some
participating prisoners to leave the facility for up to five days at a time
and requires that the participants pay all of their own expenses, it
would not be unreasonable to calculate the per diem costs of each
prisoner individually. Although having a committee painstakingly go
through the numbers to produce an accurate fee may seem time
consuming and costly, other states and counties have implemented
this plan. Baltimore County requires that the fee charged not exceed
the "actual costs incurred by the [c]ounty for food, travel, and other
expenses related to the participant's participation in the work release
'
In Ohio the prisoner is given an itemized list of his cost
program."318
of confinement after his release.319 These facilities have worked out a
program to accurately calculate the daily expenses of each prisoner,
and New York could do the same.
2. Calculating a Fee Cap
If the review required for an itemized bill is too expensive or
complicated for DOCS, there is a cheaper way to stay within the
bounds of the Takings Clause. If the statute imposed a fee cap on a
316.
317.
318.
319.

See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 11-7050) (2002).
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.37 (Anderson 2001).
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flat or sliding scale, the administrators and directors would not need
to worry that participants are paying more than their services demand.
If it costs $7,500 a year per prisoner to run the program, then the total
yearly fee can be capped at that maximum. Another alternative is to
collect the fees based on a sliding scale as New York once had, but cap
the maximum at a level that is within the true costs incurred.
The fee cap is also lucrative. Those prisons that charge inmates per
diem fees scaled according to income but capped at a maximum
generate the most money in annual revenues.320 Macomb County and
Oakland County charge prisoners between twelve and fifty-six dollars
a day and ten and thirty dollars a day, respectively.32' They receive
$575,000 and $750,000 per year in revenues.322 Milwaukee County
prison in Wisconsin charges prisoners seventeen dollars a day and
receives $1,743,500 in annual revenues. 23 No other prison on record
collects more money than these three. 324 The fee cap offers an
efficient, fair, and lucrative alternative.
CONCLUSION

Reimbursement plans, on the whole, are good for everyone. The
fees function as a strong incentive to stay out of prison, as criminals
325
will no longer see jail as a place for "three free hots and a cot.'
They also defer the burden of supporting criminals away from the
taxpayers and on to the prisoners. However, although the program is
widely beneficial, it is important to monitor the growing legislation in
the area to safeguard prisoners' rights. The current work release
participation fee in New York is a good example of a program that has
slowly evolved into a misappropriation of property. Those work
release participants who have secured high-paying jobs now find
themselves paying more in "administrative fees" than they expend as
temporary inmates. The legislature's failure to reform the statutes
authorizing these fees is evidence that work release participants,
especially those with high-paying jobs, remain vulnerable to the
political process. Honestly, how many people are lobbying for
prisoners' rights? If the legislature will not safeguard basic property
rights, perhaps the Takings Clause should.

320. Fees Paid,supra note 1, at 13-14 tbl.10.
321. Id. at 14.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 13-14.
325. S.P. Conboy, Note, Prison Reimbursement Statutes: The Trend Toward
Requiring Inmates to Pay Their Own Way, 44 Drake L. Rev. 325, 349 (1996).
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